A character of humble origins named Ahmad ibn Būya he takes Baghdad in the year 946, holding hostage, in practical terms, the very Caliph al-Mustaqfi. Ahmad ibn Būya comes from the Daylam region, north of present-day Iran and on the shores of the Caspian. He, along with his two brothers, gather a private army of Daylamite warriors to take control of important cities in the Persia area and later, with the entire caliphate. Conquering region by region and city by city until they put the caliph himself in check, who had no other choice but to surrender the city and appoint Ahmad ibn Būya Amīr al-Umara , or what is the same, "Emir of Emirs", thus leaving our character as de facto ruler of the caliphate and leaving the figure of the caliphate as a simple legitimating element and comparsa. It is worth asking ourselves now, how did it get to the point where the representative of the divinity on earth was handled like a puppet by the lords of war of the Islamic world?
When we talk about the caliphal dignity, it is advisable to focus on the meaning of the caliphal title. In the early caliphs, this title was Khalīfat Rasūl Allāh or what is the same, «Representative of the Envoy of God». With this title, the first so-called "perfect" caliphs were recognized, although, and after the attempts of the last Rāšidūn caliphs and the first Umayyad caliphs to differentiate themselves from the rest of the aristocracy ruler, the title became simply Khalīfat Allāh or "Representative of God." As we can see, it is not the same to be a "Representative of the Envoy of God" than a "Representative of God", without intermediaries, and being the holder of this dignity, the arm of the designs of the divinity on earth. Of course, and as we have advanced before, this subtle change in the caliphal title was intended to position the caliph as the maximum figure authority both politically and religiously, as well as legally.
The caliphal authority from the first Islam to the Abbasid caliphate
The modification of the nomenclature must be understood in the tribal context that surrounded the nascent Muslim state . We can easily observe this tribal component in the composition of the armies of the Rāšidūn caliphate, as well as in those of the Umayyads. We see a clear example of the above in the caliphate of Mu'āwīyah ibn Abū Sufyān (661-680), in which the caliph depended on the Arab aristocracy and their armies for military campaigns, relying only on the yund Syrian under his direct obedience. These tribal chiefs or ašrāf they were the ones who helped Mu‘āwīyah to obtain the caliphate, being rewarded with a great autonomy with respect to the central power since, the ašrāf they enjoyed direct political and military authority over the members of their tribe , leaving the figure of the caliph as primus inter pares within the Muslim state. This fact would cause these first caliphs to wish to differentiate themselves from this tribal aristocracy to make clear their predominant position over the other Arabs and Muslims, resorting to caliphal nomenclature resources, as we have already pointed out before.
In this tribal world, the caliph's legitimacy rested mainly on the fact that the recipient of the caliphal dignity was a descendant of the prophet Muḥammad , from the tribe of the Banū Qurays, increasing this legitimacy even more if the caliph also belonged to the Prophet's clan within the Quraysi tribe, the Hashimids. In this aspect, the Umayyads had serious problems of dynastic legitimacy since they did not belong to the clan of the Hashimids, but to the clan of the Umayyads, given the redundancy, thus belonging to the dynasty of the caliphs of Damascus, to a clan other than that of Muhammad. Despite all this, Mu‘āwīyah wanted that after his death, not only did the Šūra not be consulted or council of the Muslim community, who should be the next caliph, but directly undertook a campaign to attract support among the ašrāf to support his own son, Yazīd, as heir to the caliphal dignity. These facts, together with others such as the killing of a grandson of Muḥammad, Husayn, in the battle of Kerbala (680), caused this dynasty to be seen by certain sectors of the Umma or Muslim community, like a cursed dynasty of godless caliphs.
We are now in the year 743, the year of the death of the Umayyad caliph Hišām I and the proclamation, by one of the tribal groups, of the caliph al-Walid II. We must take into account that, and above all, from the caliphate of Hišām I, the factionalism and the disputes to control the caliph and his favor are increasing dizzyingly. The qaysíes (Arabs of Syria) and the qalbíes (Yemeníes), had created pressure groups that fought for the control of the figure of the caliph, coming to execute the caliph al-Walid II in 744 and the same year proclaim Yazīd III and run it shortly. This fact exposes how the caliphs had simply become part of factions fighting for power , having no qualms about killing them to get full control of the figure of the caliph.
Before talking about the Abbāsí revolt, it would be pertinent to comment and explain the institution of the walà. It did not consist of anything other than the agreement or sponsorship of a Muslim Arab on a convert to Islam , not Arabic, which would become a mawla (pl. mawali ). The convert adopted the nišba or nickname of the tribe to which the Arab Muslim who sponsored him in his conversion belonged. In this way, the mawla (client or vassal), would henceforth be attached to, and owing obedience, to the tribe of his patron in his conversion to Islam.
In this panorama of discontent between the Arab factions, we can name the a bbāsíes, family much closer to Muḥammad than the Umayyads, though, with doubts regarding the religious convictions of one of its members and founder, Abbās ibn Abd al-Muttālid. Abbās was the uncle of Muḥammad and Alīy but, despite his genealogical position, he had not been particularly prominent in the early days of Islam. The Abbasids chose Khorasan, in present-day Iran, to send their agents, including Abū Muslim, a mysterious mawla Iranian, who recruited an army of mawali Iranians, along with disgruntled Arabs, to put a member of the Prophet's family into the caliphate. The revolt broke out in 748 , with the taking of Khorasan and later, with the conquest of Kūfa in 749 and the proclamation of the head of the Abbāsí family, Abū al-Abbās al Saffāḥ as caliph that same year. Marwan II (744-750), the last Umayyad caliph of Damascus, was defeated at the battle of the Great Zab in 750, having to flee to Egypt, where he was found and executed, almost the entire Umayyad clan suffering the same fate. . In this way, the Abbasids claimed to have been the ones who had returned order and righteousness to the caliphate , bringing a relative of the Prophet to the throne and proclaiming themselves heirs to Muḥammad, since they were Hashimids, like the Prophet and unlike the Umayyads. Belonging to the family of the Prophet earned the Abbasids absolute legitimacy, not having the Umma , for the most part, inconveniences in maintaining the hereditary character of the caliphal dignity within the abbāsí lineage.
The Abbāsíes arrived having very well learned the lessons that the previous dynasties must have contemplated. After al-Saffāḥ came to the caliphate, he reorganized the military structure of this, changing the tribal ascription, by which the Umayyad contingents were articulated, by a geographical one, regardless of the tribe to which each individual belonged and prioritizing the geographical origin of this. This movement must be seen within the context in which we find ourselves. The main support of the Abbasids was not the Arab aristocracy, but the dahaqin (the aristocracy of the mawali Iranians). This fact, together with the lesson they were able to learn from the factual problems of the tribes of the Umayyad Caliphate, made geographical affiliation prevail in order to be able to better articulate the new Abbāsí military organization with a marked Iranian character. We should also comment out the a sabiyya (tribal solidarity), which could cause, in many cases, the members of the tribes to process more obedience to the local tribal power before the central one, this being tribal solidarity, an objective to be eliminated by the Abbasid caliphs . The army of direct obedience to the caliph was that of Khorasan, with the military governors being in charge in the other provinces of the Empire of organizing their own private armies, which had to be available in the event that the caliph called them for campaigns. This fact would lead to the formation of a military aristocracy that each time it would obtain a greater range of independence with respect to the central power, an aspect that would be a problem in the long run.
Iranian tradition in the caliphal authority
We must now talk about the legitimation mechanisms of the Abbāsíes, except for those of dynastic legitimacy already mentioned above. We are facing an attempt to sacralize the caliphal power by looking at some laqab or pious nicknames arrogated to themselves by nicknamed caliphs such as al-Mansūr or "the Victorious" or al-Mahdi or "the Well Guided", the latter being a laqab of fundamental importance within Islamic eschatology. We will also attend to the absolute Iranian influence in the ceremonial of the court of the abbāsíes and highlighting the phenomenon of the "hiding of the caliph", seeing this phenomenon manifested in the caliph al-Saffāḥ, who hid from his courtiers behind a curtain, just like the Šâhanšâh (King of Kings) of Persia, or even some Umayyads like Mu‘āwīyah. Other Iranian customs were implanted in the Abbasid court , such as the custom of rewarding musicians right after their performances, as the Šâhanšâh did Bahram V.
After the death of Abū al-Abbās al- Saffāḥ in the year 754, his brother and true architect of the abbāsí consolidation, al-Mansūr (754-775), came to the caliphal throne, which had its headquarters at that time in Kūfa. This would be transferred in 762 by order of this caliph to a small city that was half built and that was started by the Šâhanšâh Khusroes II and finalized by al-Mansūr to house his new capital, thus speaking of the Iranian city of Baghdad. It would be convenient to stop to analyze the etymology of «Bagdad», which means «Given by God» or «Given by the God-king». The Šâhanšâh Like Chosroes II, he believed himself to be the son of Ahura Mazda, the supreme god of Zoroastrianism. These sons of Ahura Mazda were called Bag or "god-king", thus giving a divine character to the Persian monarchy , thus differentiating the Šâhanšâh clearly from the šâh or kings of the Persian Empire. We can therefore see here al-Mansūr's intention to ensure that the caliphs were no longer "one of the many" among the aristocracy of the caliphate. Also, we observe the elaboration of a continuation story between the Šâhanšâh of Persia and the Abbasid caliphs of Baghdad, since in the mawali Iranians, the Banū Abbās had their main point of support and legitimacy, trying not to be seen by them as a foreign and intrusive dynasty.
In line with this desire to integrate the Iranian world within the caliphate, we find one of the most important religious schisms of Islamic history. We talk about the Mu'tazila , religious doctrine that mixes elements of classical Greek philosophy with the elements of Islam, adding a rationalist character to it. We have to place this doctrinal phenomenon in a context in which the caliphs were interested in the classical world, rescuing and translating countless classical Greek works which, otherwise, would never have subsequently reached Europe. It is in the year 819 when the caliph al-Ma'mūn (813-833), proclaims the Mu'tazila as the new doctrine of the caliphate. in an attempt to ensure that the caliph would always be the one to set the dogma of faith. We must comment that this was a reaction to the growing power of the ulema , doctors of Islam who started from the 8th century AD. to develop Islamic jurisprudence based on the interpretation of the Koran and the hadith or sayings and deeds of the Prophet, taking Muḥammad and his sunna , or custom, as unique normative examples, avoiding incorporating foreign elements to the fiqh or Islamic jurisprudence, establishing themselves as guarantors of the maintenance of the s aria or Islamic law. We must also seek a practical reason to further identify Islam with the Iranian world when establishing the Mu'tazila , since this doctrine also had many similarities with many foundations of Zoroastrianism.
After years of mu'tazilí doctrine in the caliphate and operation of the Mihna , being this institution a religious court guarantor of the monitoring of the Mu'tazila by the people and the religious and civil authorities, the caliph al-Mutawwakil (847-861), stops renewing the Mihna after his ascension to power, reverting to Sunni orthodoxy and erasing the Mu'tazili doctrine of the Koran and its rationalist approach to Islam from the map. From this moment it became clear that the caliph had lost the power to establish the dogma of faith. All the other caliphs tried to maintain good relations with the ulamas, since they were the ones who set the limits of the saria and their support was indispensable when it came to obtaining, from the people, the bay’a or oath of allegiance to the caliph. We must take into account that one of the foundations of the caliphal legitimacy was the maintenance and safeguarding of Islamic orthodoxy . If the caliphs failed to safeguard this or came into conflict with the ulema, they had the power to delegitimize the ruler through the fatwas or legal opinions. We can see the growing power of the ulema and their great popularity and social prestige among the people as a consequence of the increasing concealment of the caliph. In his desire to differentiate himself from the elite, the caliph made himself less and less accessible, when in the early days of Islam any member of the Umma could access it. The caliph began to communicate with the people and to express his power through an elaborate bureaucracy, and with the ruling elite through court protocol, thus presenting himself as the figure of the ulama, closer to the people.
As we can see, the caliph had already lost his religious preponderance but he would also end up losing his administrative one due to the territorial stipends requested by the military aristocracy for their services they were higher and higher, accumulating this elite (on many occasions, warlords of Turkish origin) so much territorial and administrative power, that they ended up becoming independent from the power of the caliph, leaving only a theoretical religious obedience towards him as a way of legitimize their local power in the form of politically independent emirates. As a consequence of all this, we arrive at the point where we began this essay, with the caliph being a simple legitimizing figure with no other role.
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