Civil war. It is hard to find a better medium for hostile neighbors. It is no wonder then that the Germans were changing their legs at the mere news of the May coup. They closely followed the course of the fights between the government forces and Piłsudski, making their own plans and assumptions for the future ...
Just a week after the clashes, Ulrich Rauscher - envoy extraordinary and German minister plenipotentiary in Poland - sent a comprehensive report to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs on what had happened in Warsaw. His attention was largely focused on analyzing the attitude of the soldiers fighting on both sides.
Jealous Piłsudski and mistakes of staff officers
In the report - quoted in the book "Germany defends itself against Poland 1918-1933" by Robert Citino - we can read, among others:
It's hard not to notice that the soldiers on both sides fought with courage and cunning . Infantry and reserves operated machine guns under enemy fire, participated in combat with hand grenades and used camouflage well. Cadets and a regiment from Greater Poland fought particularly well.
According to Ulrich Rauscher - a German deputy and minister plenipotentiary in Warsaw - during the May coup, the soldiers of both fighting sides did well, but the command left a lot to be desired
The MP was much less flattering about artillery and aviation, which, in his opinion, did not play a large role during the fighting, and even - in the case of air attacks - bombs fell on private homes, causing anger of the civilian population .
However, the diplomat's criticism focused primarily on the leadership of both sides. He accused the General Staff of placing a battalion at a strategic point, which was known to be friendly towards the Marshal, which resulted in the rapid desertion of the soldiers. On the other hand, Józef Piłsudski:
did not take into account the resistance of the cadets. He had the decisive advantage on the first night, so a quick charge could have crushed any resistance. Due to his delay, the cadets received reinforcements and both sides suffered heavy losses. The fact that this did not lead to a real civil war is due only to luck.
And here is Ulrich Rauscher himself, who was so interested in the condition of our army (source:public domain).
The general conclusion at this stage was that the coup - that was the term he used - had a definitely negative impact on the Polish army because had opened a deep wound that could only be healed with time and work.
Moreover, Rauscher pointed to the important role played by lower-rank officers during the fighting, followed by the soldiers. In his opinion, a situation where state power depended on lower charges should be a big worry for the new government.
The Germans evaluate the purge
As for the military circles on the Spree, they were inconsistent in the assessments of the May events. As Robert Citino writes, on the one hand, the Germans considered Józef Piłsudski as:
a strong, fearless and charismatic - if not necessarily wise - military leader who would undoubtedly do anything in his power to strengthen the Polish army.
Soldiers faithful to Józef Piłsudski near Wilanów (source:public domain).
On the other hand, the negative traits of his character were pointed out, especially a tendency to jealousy which they thought were great s the weaknesses of the leader of the nation . This impression was intensified by the Marshal's moves after taking power.
Rauscher in another report, sent in mid-August of that year, strongly criticized the personnel changes made by the new team. He pointed to the fact that Józef Piłsudski was trying to unite the army by a series of promotions, reckless layoffs and transfers. He further specified:
All over Poland, senior commanders who did not support him, either out of loyalty or out of personal hostility, were either relegated to regimental command or transferred to units faithful to Piłsudski and thus completely neutralized.
According to his account, more than twenty regiment commanders were replaced in the first weeks after the attack. Only in Wielkopolska this process has not yet taken on such proportions.
Two years later he found that the officer corps surrounding the Marshal were sticking together only because of his mystical personality . He also noticed that for the Polish army a great risk was the fact that the selection of people for high positions was made only on the basis of personality, not military talent .
A summary of the observations on the personnel policy in the Polish Army was a report sent to Berlin on May 10, 1929. The MP concluded that, thanks to the purge, Józef Piłsudski had assured himself full control of the army, but at the same time got rid of many talented and experienced officers. And those who remained realized that:
their military abilities are not as important as their "Piłsudski" which they try to prove over and over again. The diplomat was of the opinion that one could get the impression that the army, instead of increasing its combat capability, was trying to increase its internal skills.
The Germans were of the opinion that their three times smaller Reichswehr would easily cope with the Polish army. The photo shows German soldiers during the 1930 summer maneuvers.
Of course, the Germans did not focus only on sticking to the mistakes that, in their opinion, were made by the new leadership of the Polish army. Observers noticed that the Sanacja team put great emphasis on the development of its own arms industry, which was important because after regaining independence, there were virtually no arms factories in the new state. As reported in 1931 by Rauscher's successor - Hans-Adolf Moltke:
In the last five years, Poland has made a great leap forward in the defense industry. There is no doubt that it will continue to try to become self-sufficient in times of war and free itself from dependence on imported weapons in times of peace.
Progress was also noticed in enhancing the firepower of Polish artillery and saturating infantry units with more machine guns. In addition, the Germans did not miss the fact that the armored formations underwent a major change within a few years. .
The three-to-one advantage is nothing. The Reichswehr is better!
Nevertheless, at the beginning of the 1930s, the final German assessment of the effects of the May coup was almost overwhelming for the Polish army. Analysts from across the western border have unequivocally stated that even the 300,000 Polish Army has no chance against the three times smaller Reichswehr. How is this even possible? The answer to the question is given by Robert Cintino in his book:
Is Robert Cintino right to say that Józef Piłsudski was directly responsible for the poor condition of the Polish army in the 1930s? (source:public domain).
The purge of former Austrian officers and their replacement by Piłsudski's loyal supporters deprived the army of many skilled, experienced officers. […] Piłsudski did not improve […] training its officers and soldiers to no significant degree.
Reports on the maneuvers of the Polish army indicate that […] The Polish Army was in a very poor condition […]; artillery was unable to support the infantry; the tanks were far behind the front lines or they were stuck in swamps; aviation did not support land operations at all.
It is impossible to justify Piłsudski as the commander-in-chief […], failed to solve these problems.
A sad and seemingly untrue picture. But isn't the American historian right? Perhaps Marshal Józef Piłsudski - against his sincere intentions - when taking power in May 1926, did more harm to the Polish army than helped it?
Source:
Trivia is the essence of our website. Short materials devoted to interesting anecdotes, surprising details from the past, strange news from the old press. Reading that will take you no more than 3 minutes, based on single sources. This particular material is based on:
- Robert Citino, Germany defends itself against Poland 1918-1933 , Erica Publishing Institute, 2012