The outbreak of the First World War. The biggest mistake in the history of wars

At the time of its outbreak, no one considered that this war could last longer than a few months. Each side believed in a quick victory. And without thinking much, she got involved in a long-term, devastating conflict. How could you get so wrong?

The Great War plunged the world into a bloody whirl for over four years. About 65 million soldiers were mobilized on both sides between 1914 and 1918. 8.5 million of them died. The number of wounded, missing and prisoners has reached almost 30 million.

The military effort entailed enormous financial outlays. It is impossible to even estimate the enormity of economic, cultural and social losses.

Hecatomb, which turned into a conflict that began in the summer of 1914, turned out to be worse than the darkest scenarios put forward at the beginning of the war. The scale of the destruction surprised those who made the decision to unleash it the most.

Unfortunately, when it turned out that the daring strategies prepared by the military could at best be called wishful thinking, it was too late. As British politician David Lloyd George wrote, European nations "slipped over the rim of the boiling cauldron of war without a trace of fear or reflection."

As British politician David Lloyd George wrote, European nations "slipped over the rim of the boiling cauldron of war without a trace of fear or reflection."

Great expectations

It is hard to disagree with him when one examines the mood that prevailed among the leaders of European countries just before zero hour. This is how British historian Ruth Henig describes them:

It was expected that the European war that started in August 1914 would be short. The German heir to the throne expected a "lively and joyful" war. No European government has developed economic and military plans for prolonged struggles. The approach of the Russian Ministry of War in 1914 was typical:prepared for a conflict that lasted from two to six months (...).

Declaring war on each other in 1914, the European powers envisioned a series of brief, intense armed clashes, which would presumably be followed by a conference of warring parties to perpetuate the war gains with political and diplomatic aid systems. The haughty belief of the British that the troops they sent to the front would return home for Christmas was echoed in other European capitals .

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The conviction that the conflict between the Entente and the Triple Alliance would not last long made the countries of hostile alliances decide to take the risk. Although, as Ian Kershaw notes, perhaps more than belief, it was ... hope, but devoid of - according to the historian - "reflection on what can happen if reality does not match the pipe dreams." Interestingly, even those who pointed to the potential threats associated with it were sure about the imminent end of the war!

Hurry…

The key to achieving a quick and spectacular result was the offensive. The German strategy in particular was based on the idea of taking the initiative at the front. When creating it, the Chief of the General Staff, General Helmuth von Moltke, based on the plan developed in 1897-1905 by his predecessor, Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen. He followed in the footsteps of great commanders such as Frederick the Great and Napoleon. He designed short, decisive campaigns aimed at completely destroying a selected part of the enemy's troops.

Moreover, the German strategist believed that the way he proposed could fight even on two fronts. In the event of a simultaneous conflict with France and Russia, he wanted to lead a decisive attack in the west first. Then - after defeating the neighbor from the Seine - all forces had to be transferred to the east. Schlieffen optimistically assumed that thanks to a lightning-fast, massive offensive, it was possible to win against the French within a month.

The creator of the German war strategy, Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen assumed that France could be defeated even in a month.

The problem is that a very similar action plan was prepared by… practically all participants in the conflict . As historian Ian Kershaw writes:

The French knew the danger they faced, and as their field army was on par with the German in numbers, they were making plans for their own comparable offensive. The Russian plans also took the form of bold, swift, decisive offensive actions in Galicia (...). Austria-Hungary also assumed that an attack was the best form of defense. However, they assumed that in the first phase they would occupy the territory of Serbia, and that they would turn against the Russians only in a devastating tandem with Germany.

Thus, each of the continental opponents assumed primarily offensive actions. It was the offensive that was to be the way to a decisive - and quick - victory. No one was making plans in case a defensive retreat to defensive positions was necessary.

Contrary to the expectations of European strategists, the conflict very quickly took the form of a trench warfare.

… or not at all

How do you explain this obsession with "lightning fast" victories and your reluctance to plan your defense? Paradoxically, it resulted from a realistic view of the situation. The leaders of the warring states realized that engaging in a conflict only made sense if it could be won quickly.

In 1914, no one was interested in the prolonged struggle, because it was slowly being realized how high their cost would be. The decades preceding the outbreak of World War I brought enormous changes in the military field. The leader of some of them was Germany, which mobilized huge numbers of people in the struggles of 1866-1870, among others thanks to the introduction of universal conscription in times of peace. The development of the railway and telegraph network enabled their efficient movement and constant communication between the divisions.

At that time, artillery and long-range weapons were also improved. Subsequent local skirmishes revealed their chilling destructive potential. A Pole, Jan Bloch, warned at the end of the 19th century that the war that the world knows is becoming a thing of the past. In his opinion, the combination of millions of troops and modern weapons had to lead to a stalemate, in which the armies facing each other, unable to gain an advantage, slowly bleed out .

The goal of the offensive strategy was to avoid this very black scenario. European generals were still under the illusion that it was possible. Military historian Michael Howard notes that they were "inspired" by two conflicts in particular - the Second Boer War of 1899-1902 and the Russo-Japanese conflict of 1904-1905. In the first case, the researcher writes, the British won "largely thanks to the cavalry, which had been announced by military reformers for years to fall." In the second:

The Japanese were able, thanks to the skillful tactics of using infantry and artillery and the suicidal courage of their troops, to defeat the Russians in subsequent battles and make them ask for peace.

The lesson learned by the military preparing for the battle was simple. The war can still be won, but only if a decisive, even reckless blow is made. The enemy should be overpowered by throwing the maximum number of troops on him and not allowing him to take the initiative. So there could be one strategy:offensive.

Barbarians, decadents and rentiers

It should also be added that it was easier for European leaders to believe in their own victory, the worse their opinion of their rivals was. " The German army is much better than the armies of its enemies" - strategist Alfred von Schlieffen boasted to his sister - "it's like Europeans against Indians or niggers [sic!] ”.

It was anticipated that the soldiers would be able to return home for Christmas. Unfortunately, the months passed, and contact with the family could only be maintained by letter ...

Such and similar claims spread with the rise of the Reich. The Russians were portrayed as semi-savage barbarians. The French - blasé, disobedient lazy people . A great nation was seen in the British, but in recent times it has rested on its laurels and only cuts off the coupons of its former successes. The Germans, of course, were not alone in this attitude. In the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the war, almost everywhere there was a marked increase in nationalist sentiment.

Perhaps it was this ubiquitous disregard for adversaries that made little thought about potential defensive scenarios? It certainly constituted an additional argument for joining the war. The war which - as everyone around it was arguing - could not be lost. And yet they all lost.