Citizens in modern Western society are so little involved in government that there is talk of a crisis of the liberal system. In spite of all the differences, could not ancient Athens be an example? In the classical ideal, the priority was not the individual, but the proper functioning of the civil community. When every citizen had a share in the state that suited him, a just society would emerge.
What should we think of the relationship between citizen and government? What is the point of elections anyway? And how can we create more cohesion between old and new citizens without encroaching on everyone's freedom? Questions such as these have been the subject of intense debate in recent years. The central concept in these issues is citizenship:the way in which everyone who is a rightful citizen of our society gives substance to those rights. One source of inspiration in this debate is citizenship from the ancient world, especially the citizenship of the classical Greek polis and in particular of democratic Athens (c. 500–300 BC). What leads do you think you can find there?
Modern democratic practice is based on a citizen's conception that unites the principles of rationalism, self-determination and individual freedom. Since the French Revolution, this liberal ideology, with its ups and downs, has become the guiding principle in the political organization of nation states in Western Europe and North America. Key points include the separation between legislative, executive and judicial power, as argued by the enlightened philosopher Montesquieu, the separation of church and state, and a number of fundamental rights that citizens must not only protect against each other, but above all against the state.
Every citizen has a number of obligations towards the state, such as paying taxes and sometimes also compulsory military service. The state has some obligations towards the citizens, such as protection against violence and the provision of education. Furthermore, both parties leave each other alone as much as possible and citizens are in principle not obliged to each other. The citizens delegate their political power by electing representatives and the implementation of the policy rests with professional officials.
This state of affairs appears to be no longer satisfactory for a large number of citizens. The parliament and the civil servants would have been too far removed from the everyday experience of the citizens and the great individual freedom would have led to fragmentation of social life, isolation of individuals and indifference to the community. The political problems of the Western European democracies are therefore seen as a crisis of liberalism. But the benefits of the liberal tradition – equal justice for all, freedom of the individual, separation of church and state – are not small. Should they then be sacrificed to limit the disadvantages?
Although the scope of individual and political fundamental rights is sometimes called into question (Can the government ban a burqa? Should statements that fellow citizens find offensive should be banned?), there is broad consensus that civil rights should be and remain what they were. The question is whether a stronger content can and should be given to citizenship. This concerns a number of related rights and obligations of individuals vis-à-vis the community. This should not be understood as the political organization in the strict sense, but as the social world on which the political organization is based or of which it is a reflection. It is precisely for this that classical Athenian citizenship offers inspiration.
Athenian citizenship
This is not obvious, because the differences between the democracy of classical Athens and that of our own time are great. It is immediately noticeable that in Athens the legislative and controlling power was in the hands of the citizens themselves. The people's assembly decided on legislation, the dikasteria (a kind of large courts) controlled officials and policy makers. Those officials and policy makers were themselves citizens chosen from among all citizens or chosen by lot for a one-year term. This effective participation of citizens makes Athens a direct democracy and contrasts with modern representative democracy.
Moreover, the definition of those who could participate as politically active citizens was limited in Athens by our current standards. A citizen (m/f) was someone who descended from two civilian parents, but only the male citizens were involved in political affairs – a situation that was no different in the Netherlands until 1919 and in France even until 1945. Free non-citizens and unfree were also excluded from political participation in Athens.
An equally important difference, less often given the attention it deserves, is the lack of separation of powers in Athens. It was the same citizens who exercised these three functions, and they saw in that very fact the kratos (power) of the demos (the people) embodied. The consequences for the legal protection of, for example, an office holder who has been charged with failing policy can be guessed.
However, if we leave out the elements that no longer fit with our conceptions of law and reason, the ancient idea of active citizenship appears to offer an interesting starting point. It is precisely the direct participation of citizens that is essential in this regard. The debate takes place partly on a theoretical level, with ethical and legal questions about citizens' rights and obligations, and partly on a practical level, about the ways in which citizens can actually participate in government.
Aristotle and the liberal crisis
Against this background, great interest in the political work of Aristotle (384-322) is growing again. In his treatise Politica the Greek philosopher examined the strengths and weaknesses of the political systems of his day. His goal was to work for the polis map out the best possible political structure and find the citizen's definition that would fit it. Unlike his teacher Plato (429-347), who wanted to design a form of government that would conform to his philosophical ideals, Aristotle based himself on his empirical analysis of human behavior and political action. It was clear to him that people are guided by self-interest, the urge to assert themselves and financial gain, and you had better take that into account. This realism is perhaps one of the reasons that Aristotle lends itself to modern interpretations. However, it is above all the context of the polis who makes his theories attractive for current questions.
The argument in the Politica is based on the premise that only a state in which the political structure is just in the minds of the citizens is viable. In fact, the purpose of living in a state (polis ) is to lead a good life. That justice and that good life are only realized if every citizen has a share in the state that suits him. The proper functioning of the civil community is thus paramount and the role of the individual is thereby determined. This is in contrast to liberalism, which assumes that if individuals are doing well, society will also be well.
Citizenship always involves both a passive and an active role:the core of political citizenship is to rule and be governed in turn. Unlike democratic Athens, which in principle set no quality requirements, Aristotle believed that citizens should be educated to this role and develop the required qualities. His ideal was a democracy made up of citizens who could meet these demands. It would therefore be impossible for a citizen to outsource his political authority to a representative. Nor could a citizen conceive of his freedom as a freedom to abstain from the community to which he belongs. True freedom consists precisely in participating in the political process.
Theoretically, this sounds appealing, but inevitably new questions arise. Aristotle, for example, believed that political justice should be based on proportional equality, in proportion to each person's qualities and thus differing per individual or group. This is inconsistent with our legal principle of absolute equality before the law, including in political matters. Moreover, the choice of parliamentary representatives does not imply a distance between politics and society by chance. The direct will of the people is not always a wise guide, as history (including that of Athens) has shown. Aristotle had also seen this, and for that reason wanted to limit the right to participation to citizens with reason and property.
In a democracy like ours, the representative bodies are intended to achieve a certain distance from the masses of the citizens, but Aristotle's proposal to link the right to participation to reason and property is inconsistent with our principles of equality. And finally, for the implementation of the policy, in our complicated society you cannot do everything with voluntary amateurs, as happened in Athens. Most, including politically important functions, were filled in turn by all citizens, there was no question of a select group of more or less professional administrators. In short, the main points of the Politica must be translated into proposals that fit our society. The starting point remains the idea that citizens should be active in the community. Is that also possible in reality?
Democracy and cohesion
In addition to theory, ancient practice also offers interesting parallels. Athenian society had a significant number of larger and smaller communities, especially at the local level but also on the scale of the polis as a whole. Any deme (municipality) had a council and a demarch (mayor). Within the demen and between different demen countless larger and smaller groups were also active, which almost without exception jointly aimed at the cult of a god or heros to take care of. These groups also had a board that, like all other boards, constantly changed its composition.
Precisely because of the religious basis of Athenian community life, this state of affairs is often reminiscent of the countless clubs and associations that determined social life in the Netherlands during the period of pillarization. However, the important difference with Athens lies in the degree of mixing. In the Netherlands, Catholics played football with Catholics, Protestants with Protestants; the groups always remained separate. In Athens people (men more than women) were involved in societies of all kinds and in all kinds of places. For example, every Athenian citizen had a role in a network of groups, which together formed the social basis of government and society.
Immigrants were also included in some of these groups. Conversely, Athens had also incorporated some immigrant cults into the religious framework of the polis. This set of religious grouping meant that immigrants had a clear and recognized place within the polis Athens.
Comparative historical research strongly suggests that there is a close relationship between such a community culture and the degree of democratization of a society. The cohesion that developed in Athens through religious participation may help to explain the resilience of Athenian democracy. The policy managed to recover from oligarchic coups, two disastrous wars, the loss of an empire and a series of diplomatic failures thanks to the cohesion between all its inhabitants.
Of course, once again, the content of Athenian community life is not directly applicable to the current situation in the Netherlands. What is possible in a polytheistic religion will not work with monotheistic religions. And we should not seek cohesion in the form of religion or unity of morals. The pursuit of cohesion should not lead to homogenization. It is precisely in the diversity of opinions, freedom of religion and expression, and separation of church and state that we see modern, liberal principles that should under no circumstances be subjected to a striving for cohesion. But the form, the classic idea of participation, can help develop a new understanding of citizenship, especially on a small-scale, local level. In any case, it is worth a try.