One of the timeless myths of modern Greek history is the "No" of the dictator Ioannis Metaxas, in the early hours of October 28, 1940. Overall, Metaxas' period is one of the darkest ideologically, and least enlightened of recent Greek history, with persecutions, exiles and torture of dissidents, with censorship, with burning of books, and with little information about the social processes that took place in the period before the war.
In any case, Metaxas himself was not the great patriot of NO to Mussolini. Metaxas' NO was Siloam's swimming pool for him and his regime, it was a communication device to hide the fact that he himself had different plans for the country with the policy of "neutrality", but he was not helped by the conditions to this direction.
"Illuminated inscriptions of 'NO' shine with a middle huge 'X' and a crown above it giving the mark of official celebration. [...] It is this celebration of the great day, the famous 28th of October that the Greek people as if electrified presented the greatest outburst of its history? Is this celebration of the great day which is above all ANTI-FASCIST?" wrote in an editorial on October 28, 1945 the director of the newspaper "Rizospastis" K. Karagiorgis.
"No" had been decided since December 6, 1935, when Britain asked the Balkan countries and Turkey whether they would support Great Britain in the event of a British-Italian conflict due to League of Nations sanctions against Mussolini's country. In June 1937, Metaxas still stated in the Sunday Times, in an interview in Athens, that Greek interests are linked to England, as the palace was, after all, openly in favor of Britain.
It is worth noting that George II provided support to the August 4th regime, however his relations with Metaxas had cooled considerably when the dictator was trying to find a way to ensure a neutrality, which for a time he actually negotiated with the Germans.
Today, the response to the Italian ultimatum is considered by several historians to be the result of public opinion pressure and a result of the government's foreign policy, since Greece had been preparing for years for an imminent attack by hostile forces.
Thus, Metaxas' speech to the Greek people announcing the war with Italy was a necessary situation for him from which he could not escape.
The leadership was preparing disgrace
The commander of the Pindos Detachment, colonel K. Davakis, has said that the leadership was "preparing a disgrace", which the Army turned into an epic. And that the instructions were "to throw in some rifles for the honor of the arms". And G. Kafantaris (s.s.:former prime minister), with his well-known caustic spirit, said that Metaxas' "NO" was a surprise, because he was the only Greek who could say "YES" (Sp. Linardatos "The anti-fascist NO of our people and the "NO" said by I. Metaxas", "Anti" magazine, vol. 4, 19.10.1974.)
The then ambassador of Italy in Athens, Emanuele Grazzi, has characteristically written that Metaxas "wanted at all costs to avoid war with Italy, which he feared very much". Precisely because he was afraid for himself.
It is also worth noting that Metaxas had received strong criticism for the management of the IKA funds , which was an obligation of Greece after the ratification of international labor agreements in 1920 (established by law 5733/1932 (article 12) during the government of El. Venizelos), with the first commander the then professor of sociology, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos (in the period 1934 - 1935 ), and was created after intense class struggles. You can read more myths about the so-called "social" policy of Metaxas here.
As for the management of the money for the war fronts, you can read below.
The Praxis Review magazine write-up on the myth of NO, below:
"The so-called "NO" of the fascist Metaxas is one of the timeless myths of the regime's propaganda in Greece, which is reproduced to this day. By imposing a fascist dictatorship, the bourgeoisie and Metaxas had declared, objectively, the Greek people as an enemy.
At the same time, they strengthened militarism and used it not for some "national interests" but for involvement in imperialist plans (and give and take with "supplies" that came from them, equipment, etc.). S. Linardatos writes that "the exorbitant military expenditures of August 4th did not in any way contribute to repelling the Italian attack, as they were unilaterally oriented towards repelling the Bulgarian danger and - completely anachronistic:2 billion Dr. in Eastern Macedonia, compared to only 1.5 - 2 million (one in a thousand!) spent on the Greek-Albanian border! On the eve of the war, the Epirus army did not even have anti-tank weapons, and the Pindos detachment (Davaki detachment) on the morning of October 28th "found without spare ammo"!
A.Papagos himself, head of the GES in 1940, wrote that "Greece suffered the unprovoked Italian attack of October 28 almost unarmed". All this was not simply a matter of "incompetence" but, in the final analysis, of political-class orientation.
We'll shoot some rifles in honor of the guns
The Greek bourgeoisie was basically interested in its sovereignty and not in the defense of the people of the country, which had been immersed in imperialist rivalries. For this reason and as the war approached, terrified, she elaborated defeatist plans because she feared that a possible war conflict and its extension would endanger her authority. "Papagos declared to the chief of staff, colonel Georgoulis, that "we will fire some rifles for the honor of the weapons", (S. Linardaros, "Ioannis Metaxas and the great powers", p. 184).
Proof of this is the plan to abandon Epirus, without a substantial conflict, in the event of an Italian attack, which the military leadership had elaborated and which resulted in the immediate retreat of the army to Aetoloakarnania at the height of Amvrakikos and eastward through the passes of Epirus to Western Macedonia!
The reason why the Italian offensive of October 28, 1940 was thwarted was precisely that this plan of the Metaxas administration was not implemented , since the local military units in Epirus refused to implement it, but also the heroism of the "Davaki detachment" whose abandonment by the Metaxas administration has been confirmed even by the chief of staff himself, then the right hand of the Chief of the GES A. Korozis, in his book "The Wars 1940-41":"someone had to be blamed for our quantitative inadequacy of the defense of Pindos, Colonel K. Davakis, died. The General Administration had indicated our weakness there. So the Government remained, I. Metaxas who, when he was asked to pre-enlist the 1st Mer. and go there, refused to approve the measure".
From all this there could not be - and there was not - a "NO" of Metaxas. And Metaxas himself was afraid, since he knew that his dictatorship was based on business interests in Greece (Industrialists, Publishers, etc.) on British imperialism and the Glyxburgs, and a war might lead his bosses to other options or to his overthrow by the people.
This is not an estimate but the words of the dictator himself, who later worried about the victories of the Greek army:December 5, 1940 he writes in his diary:
"Continuous victories of progress. Concern for my future? Is this right? On my part? And December 31, 1940:"In such a struggle internal polities are extinguished. Who will be left standing? God help".
Metaxas's condition is so sad that the Italian ambassador Grazzi writes in his diary that he was thinking about whether "the old man will be left on his hands" when he announces the declaration of war. When he announced it to him, October 28, 1940, shortly before 3 in the morning, there were only the two of them (Gratsi and Metaxas). Both have left written accounts of the meeting, which do not mention a word of a "NO" from the dictator. Graci in his book "The Beginning of the End" writes that Metaxas trembled and almost burst into tears and answered him, saying "even if he wanted to surrender, he could not find within three hours the time to take orders from ' the King and to convey the necessary instructions and "if at least I could show him what were the strategic points which the Italian government wanted to understand".
And this because he had simply recognized the situation ("Alors, c'est la guerre" - so we have war). Graci said he had no idea and replied "you see it's impossible (to do anything)".
Metaxas himself, who is supposed to have said "NO", in his own personal diary, dated October 28, 1940, writes:"At three in the morning Grazzi is coming. War!" (I. Metaxas:"Diary", volume IV, p. 516). Not even he himself writes about a "NO".
And it couldn't since the meeting was - in essence - a formal affair, given that the demands of the Italians were outrageous, vaguely worded (consciously), while giving a margin of only 3 hours.
The attack was pre-decided.
I am concerned about the over-optimistic Common Opinion
So the dictator simply recognized the reality, although, even there, he tried to explore - in vain - "ways of understanding" with the fascist invaders. This is also confirmed by the minister of Metaxas Tsifo, who participated in the first meeting at dawn of that historic night:
"Besides, the deadline of the ultimatum was three hours so that there was not even time for any action, even if there was the slightest disposition". The "NO" of the fascist Metaxas was a fabrication of the newspapers that - stuffed with money and privileges - incensed the dictator.
The only real "NO" was what the people said.
As for Metaxas, on October 28, 1940, the day the war begins, he looks surprised ("The fanaticism of the people unimaginable") and the next day he begins to worry that the people are rising up to fight the invaders ("I am worried by the over-optimistic Common Opinion"). The same line of the ruling class will continue:Refusing to release political prisoners who asked to fight, handing them over to the conquerors, refusing to equip the Cretans, dossing, the escape to Cairo, etc.
Such a black history of the sovereigns, needs myths like the "NO" of Metaxas, to justify itself".
And we complete from the book of Spyros Linardatos, "Ioannis Metaxas and the Great Powers", Proskenio publications, p. 183", as retrieved from Ef. Syn:
"Because Metaxas, as we saw in those critical hours, was concerned with the August 4th regime, which he wanted to preserve while he was alive but also after his death. That is why he wanted to wage a regime war, not an anti-fascist one and That is why, despite the pressures of the British and the Staff, he finally forbade the use of notable senior officers (St. Sarafis, K. Ventiris, I. Tsigantes, D. Psaros, E. Bakirtzis, K. Tsamakos, E. Kalambalikis etc. .etc.) because they were democratic. That is why he ordered the exiled communists, who surrendered, finally, after the collapse, to the Gestapo, to remain in the quarantine and prisons".
Sources / Bibliography:
Emmanuele Gratsi, "The beginning of the end - the operation against Greece",
Ioannis Metaxas, "Personal Diary, volume D,
Sp. Linardatos, "The foreign policy of August 4",
Sp. Linardatos, "Ioannis Metaxas and the great powers",
Nikos Pigadas, "The NOT of Romiosyny" Athanasios Korozis, "The wars of 1940-41 successes and responsibilities",
Neokosmos Grigoriadis, "The World War 1939-1945,
A. Papagos:"The war of Greece 1940 - 1941",
Charalambos Katsimitros, "Epirus Promahousa, the action of the VIII Division in the 1940-41 war".
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