The Greek Revolution started in March 1821 and in the Peloponnese, in the wake of the movement of Al. Ypsilanti in Moldowallachia. Ai Paleai Patrai, today's Patra, was, from the late Middle Ages, one of the largest cities of the Peloponnese. Unfortunately the Turkish presence was strong there. Since the outbreak of the revolution, the Greeks tried to expel the Turks from the important city, but they never succeeded, due to the endemic discord, the eternal wound of Hellenism.
Since February 1821, the tension in the Peloponnese had reached its peak. Ypsilanti's move to the Moldavian hegemonies had fueled Turkish suspicion. The tension did not peak in March with the first clashes taking place. In Patras, the revolutionary effervescence was evident from February already. According to documents from the foreign consulates based in the city, it seems that the Greeks refused to pay the head tax to the Turks, which caused concern to the conquerors. Also From the 20th of February the tension began to increase and by the 6th of March the Turks had withdrawn to the fortress of the city with their families and treasures.
But the Greeks also began to send women and children to the Iptane Islands or the surrounding mountains in view of the start of military operations. Greek civilians also fled to the foreign consulates in the city, mainly the French and the Russian, as the British consul Green was hostile towards the Greeks and posed all kinds of obstacles even to those trying to cross to the British-occupied Ionian Islands.
The outbreak of the revolution
On March 23, the Turkish authorities of the city summoned the foreign consuls, asking them to exert their influence on the Greeks so that they would not rise up. However, in the afternoon of the same day, approximately 300 Turks attacked the home of the prefect of the city Ioannis Papadiamantopoulos and the building of the Metropolis of Old Patras and set fire which soon spread to the area of foreign consulates.
This attack by the Turks was the trigger for the uprising of the Greeks. Groups of armed Greeks led by shoemaker Panagiotis Karatzas, pharmacist Nikolaos Gerakaris and merchant Evangelos Livadas organized and attacked the Turks. At the same time, other groups of Greeks attacked the Turks in the area of the Russian consulate, who had meanwhile been reinforced with compatriots from Rio. Soon the conflict became general and the city was given over to violence and fire.
Finally, after a fierce overnight battle, the Turks were forced to take refuge in the city's fortress. Gradually, Greeks from the surrounding areas began to flock to the city. This is how the bishop of Old Patras Germanos, Andreas Londos, Andreas Zaimis and other chieftains arrived with their men gathering a significant number of warriors. There on March 25, the day of the Annunciation of the Virgin, the warriors swore on the cross for "freedom or death" in the square of Ag. Georgiou.
After the swearing in, the Greeks set up the Achaean Directorate with the aim of systematically besieging the Turks locked in the fortress. At the same time, the Greeks issued a proclamation to the foreign consuls declaring to them the beginning of the revolution and their decision to fight to the death. At the same time, the siege of the fortress was systematically organized. An "armoury" was set up for the necessities of the fight, while Iptanisians transported seven cannons from ships anchored in the harbor which they placed in an artillery they built opposite the fortress.
In the meantime the fight had spread throughout the Peloponnese (Moria) and parts of Central Greece (Roumeli). In Patras, however, the situation was starting to get worse for the Greeks as Turkish forces reinforced their compatriots defending the fortress. From Agrinio (then Vrahori) the pasha of Evia Yusuf Selim was ordered to move towards Patras and lift the siege of the fortress.
Indeed, on April 3, Yusuf crossed the strait of Rio - Antirio unmolested and marched towards the city, having been informed about the tactical situation and the capabilities of the Greeks by the British consul Green, who did not particularly like the revolution. The Greeks did not even stop to face Yusuf but those who could fled as well as the Turks imprisoned in the fortress made an exit.
A massacre of the Greeks, mainly civilians, followed, where hundreds were killed and even more were captured. Three days later Yusuf's forces, numbering more than 600 men, were reinforced by 3,500 Albanians under Mustafa the Keghachiab. This force had been sent in order to lift the loose siege of Tripolitsa by the Greeks.
Mustafa with his Albanians really moved actively. First he burned Aegio and moving to Corinth lifted the siege of Acrocorinth and entered the city in triumph. From there he marched to Argos. On April 25 the Greeks tried to stop him but suffered a heavy defeat and were disbanded. The result of this defeat was the lifting of the siege of Nafplio.
It was therefore obvious that as long as the Turks held Patras they could at will transfer forces to the Peloponnese, threatening to crush the revolution before it had even begun, given the fact that they controlled the Makrynoros Straits through which the Ioannina road passed and still passes – Patras.
However, with Mustafa busy in Tripolitsa, the Greeks again attempted to besiege Patras from afar from May 1821, according to the model that Kolokotronis applied in Tripolitsa. The Greeks managed to defeat the Turks who tried to break the lines of their besiegers in the battle near I.M. Panagias Oblou, just like on June 2 in the battle of Riganokampos. However, the Turkish losses were compensated by the arrival of Laliote Turks from the village of the same name, Lala, in Ilia.
Also, due to the inability of the Greek revolutionary fleet to block Patraikos effectively, the Turks were continuously supplied and therefore did not face a food problem as happened in Tripolitsa.
Reinforced with the Lalais, Yusuf launched a new attack and on June 28 he set fire to the Oblou Monastery. A few days later the Turks, under Yusuf himself, attempted a new raid. Although they were forced to retreat in the end, they nevertheless caused significant damage to the region. On July 12, in a similar operation, the Turks were defeated again. However, these battles must be understood as large-scale skirmishes. These defensive victories of the Greeks were not of crucial importance and did not affect the general strategic situation in the region of the northwestern Peloponnese.
Dissolving…
The prolongation of the fight in Patras caused concern in the Greek camp. Dimitrios Ypsilantis, realizing that if the umbilical cord of the Turks of Patras with western Sterea and Nafpaktos was not cut, the siege could not have a happy ending, he asked the fleet to control Patraikos. However, this was not achieved.
In the meantime, in the area of Patras, the Greeks had managed to advance their positions slightly, and I.M. became the focus of the struggle. Nursing home at the foot of the Panahaikos mountain. The Turks had occupied the monastery when it was abandoned by the Greeks. Now, however, armed units led by Panagiotis Karatzas, Thodorakis Grivas and Andreas Londo as well as Fokas and Gerakaris, advanced with the aim of recapturing the monastery with the aim of a tighter blockade of the city.
The Greeks fortified themselves around the monastery and the Turks, on August 8, 1821, attempted to expel them from their strongholds. The Turks, having cavalry and artillery, attacked the Greek fortifications with speed. The battle lasted 24 whole hours and was fought with stubbornness and heroism on both sides. Ultimately, however, the Turks were defeated and forced to retreat to Patras, leaving the Greeks in possession of the monastery.
However, this success was tarnished by the murder, on September 4, of Panagiotis Karatzas by Greeks due to personal rivalries. The result was that many prominent leaders left the siege and the Greek camp was almost disbanded. The "painful" discord that Solomon also called struck and would strike again in Patras and beyond, during the revolution.
Even worse, however, on September 7, the combined Turkish-Egyptian fleet under Kara Ali and Ismail Gibraltar appeared off Patras, spreading joy among the Turks and gloom among the remaining Greeks. On the evening of September 8, before Turkish-Egyptian forces landed, the Greeks abandoned their positions near the city and withdrew.
The next day the forces disembarked from the united fleet joined the Turks of the fortress and all together attacked the Greek positions at Prinarokastro and the metochi of the Oblou monastery and dispersed them without even a fight. The siege of Patras had been completely lifted. The Greeks had been defeated not so much by the enemy but mainly by the eternal disease of the race, discord.
In general, the siege of Patras could not succeed if the Greek fleet did not prohibit the supply of the Turks there. Since something like this did not happen, the development could hardly be positive for the Greeks.
Moves of shame
At this critical moment, however, came the news of the defeat of Tripolitsa (September 23, 1821). In fact, the Albanians of Yusuf's force received a letter from their compatriots who escaped from Tripolitsa after their agreement with Kolokotronis and their morale was shaken. With the same letter, the Albanians who escaped from Tripolitsa told the Albanians of Patras to attempt a similar compromise with the Greeks in order to save their heads, informing them at the same time about the fate of the Turks of Tripolitsa.
So the Albanians of Patras, under Aslan Agha, abandoned the Turks and left Patras, weakening the guard. If there had been a fighting Greek force available at that time the city could have been liberated thus securing the Morea and providing the Greeks with an important port of communication with the West.
In October, however, it was assigned to Kolokotronis to attempt the liberation of Patras. Kolokotronis was appointed head of the operation by the Peloponnesian Senate. However, from the beginning he faced problems not from the Turks, but from the Greeks. Prokrites and the portion of the "politicians" did not wish for a new success of Kolokotronis who, after Tripolitsa, was the dominant figure of the revolution and his name had become a legend for the Greeks.
So while Kolokotronis was trying to gather men for the operation the prerogatives did what they could to prevent him. In the end he managed to gather only 1,700 men. The prefects of Achaia themselves, in their letter to Dimitrios Ypsilantis, requested the dispatch of only 300 men necessarily led by "a Deligiannis or a Mavromichalis", otherwise threatening that if another - Kolokotronis - was in charge "they would remove him to the rifle!
"Their aim was for me not to take Patras and get stronger. If they let me go right away, the Turks would give me the keys out of fear", says the Old Man of Moria in his memoirs, describing this morbid climate that prevailed at the time and would unfortunately worsen later. The Achaeans, however, believed that they could liberate Patras by themselves and did not need Kolokotronis. But also between them there was no shortage of jealousies and conflicts. So the Petmaza and Koumanioti families, who had been expelled by the other candidates, were trying to return, while the Patras and Kalavryta candidates were trying to do it alone.
On the evening of October 21, the largely disorganized forces of the latter moved against the Turks and, taking them by surprise, occupied the area of the Nursing Home, Saravali and Perivola in the city. As soon as dawn broke, Greeks and Turks started firing. The exchange continued throughout the day. But as soon as night fell the disorderly sections of the advancemen simply rose and left with the men more desirous of securing whatever booty they had thus far seized than of continuing the "war".
Finally, with the intervention of Andreas Zaimis and Andreas Londos, the evil was contained and the decision was even taken for the Greeks to carry out an attack on the fortress. About 3,000 Greek armed men gathered for the attack. A little later, Vasilios Petmezas also arrived with a significant force, but the others warned him to leave as he was considered a man of Kolokotronis.
In the meantime, Yusuf, who had gone to Nafpaktos, worried about the developments in Patras, sent reinforcements, including a cavalry division of 300 men. Returning to Patras, he decided to recapture the parts of the city that had been occupied by the Greeks. So on November 22 he launched an attack against the Greek positions.
The Greeks, with the exception of 70 men of London, fled at the appearance of the Turkish cavalry. The 70 were shut up in a house and defended themselves vigorously. But when they realized that they were left alone, they made an exit to escape. 53 of them made it. The others fell fighting. This is how the attempt of the local elites to liberate Patras ended ingloriously.
Kolokotronis in charge
The Turks in Patras were left undisturbed for a long time. After the capture of the fortress of Acrocorinth, however, the question of Patras came back. However, the Turks were not idle and in the first days of February 1822, Turkish ships transported 8-9,000 Turkish warriors from Anatolia to Patras, significantly strengthening Yusuf's forces.
Thus more than 12,000 Turks gathered in the region in Achaia from where they could threaten the entire Peloponnese. Having no other choice, the Minister of Defense Ioannis Kolettis, an opponent of Kolokotronis, decided to send Geros to the area so that the siege could finally be successfully completed.
Equipped with a written order from Kolettis, Kolokotronis managed to gather 6,000 men. He had previously sent Dimitrios Plapoutas, Konstantinos Petmezas and Apostolis and Gennaios Kolokotronis to occupy important positions in the area of Patras in order to prepare the ground.
Meanwhile, on February 26, about 2,000 Turkish "Kaklamani", as the from Anatolia, they left the walls and moved towards Haladritsa.
The approximately 500 Greeks who were guarding the area could not withstand the Turkish attacks and were forced to retreat. The Turks set fire to the town and prepared to return to Patras. On their return, however, they were confronted by the men of Plaputos and Gennaios and Apostolis Kolokotronis.
Despite their numerical superiority and the fact that they also had artillery, the Turks were defeated and fled, taking refuge in the city. The losses on both sides were not significant but the blow to the morale of the Turks was heavy as the considered fanatical Eastern Turks were defeated in their first serious conflict with the Greeks.
The battle of Gerokomio - Saravali
After the victory in Chalandritsa, the Greeks came closer to Patras, occupying positions around the city. On March 1, Theodoros Kolokotronis also arrived in the area, who immediately assessed the situation and drew up his plans. Kolokotronis had no difficulty in assessing the value of the location of the Nursing Home, southwest of the city, and of the monastery there.
"I immediately sent 100 nomads and they captured the monastery at Gerokomou, a cannon shot (within a cannon shot) from Patran," says Geros in his memoirs. "And when the Turks saw that the monastery was seized, they went to war, thinking that it was ours first and the troops moved and the war became fierce and we took about eighty heads," he says. Plaputas, Gennaios Kolokotronis and the standard-bearer of Geros Nikolaos Karahalios participated in the battle and distinguished themselves.
Ουσιαστικά ο Κολοκοτρώνης κινούμενος ταχύτατα κατέλαβε το στρατηγικής σημασίας μοναστήρι που απείχε, όπως ο ίδιος ανέφερε, απόσταση βολής πυροβόλου – δηλαδή λιγότερο από 1.500-2.000 μ. από το φρούριο – προκαλώντας τους Τούρκους να επιτεθούν κατά οχυρής θέσης, έχοντας αναπτύξει τις λοιπές δυνάμεις του προς υποστήριξη αυτών.
Η μονή Γηροκομείου ήταν το δόλωμα και οι Τούρκοι έπεσαν στην παγίδα και ηττήθηκαν. Μετά τη νίκη αυτή ο Κολοκοτρώνης αναδιέταξε τις δυνάμεις του τοποθετώντας δυνάμεις Αχαιών στη θέση Κυνηγού, όχι μακριά από τη Ι.Μ. Γηροκομείου, Τριπολιτσιώτες, υπό τον Γεώργιο Σέκερη στην περιοχή του ληνού, στον λεγόμενο πύργο του Σαϊταγά, αριστερά της μονής, τον Γενναίο στον Παλαιόπυργο, στην περιοχή του σημερινού Πετρωτού, τον Α. Λόντο και Δ. Μελετόπουλο στο χωριό Σελλά, στο Παναχαϊκό όρος, τον Κανέλο Δεληγιάννη στο Πριναρόκαστρο (σημερινό Πουρναρόκαστρο), ανατολικά της πόλης, ενώ ο ίδιος και ο Πλαπούτας έμεινε στο Σαραβάλι, νότια της πόλης, όπου και το αρχηγείο του. Επίσης ο Γέρος ανέπτυξε μικρότερα τμήματα υπό τους Αποστόλη Κολοκοτρώνη, Δ. Πετμεζά, Αναγνώστη Παπασταθόπουλο και Ι. Πέτα σε άλλες επίκαιρες θέσεις γύρω από την πόλη.
Έτσι ο Κολοκοτρώνης ακολουθώντας ουσιαστικά το σχέδιο απομόνωσης της Πάτρας που ακολούθησε και στην πολιορκία της Τριπολιτσάς, κατάφερε, εν πολλοίς, να αποκλείσει τους περισσότερους Τούρκους στα οχυρά της πόλης. Οι Τούρκοι με τρόμο διαπίστωναν καθημερινά τις προόδους των Ελλήνων και θορυβημένοι αποφάσισαν να αντιδράσουν. Έτσι ο Γιουσούφ πασάς, μαζί με τον επικεφαλής των «Κακλαμάνων» Μεχμέτ αποφάσισε να συντρίψει μια και καλή τους Έλληνες πολιορκητές.
Ο Κολοκοτρώνης αναφέρει πως οι Τούρκοι διέθεταν περί τους 12.000 άνδρες. άλλες πηγές αναφέρουν πάντως μικρότερους αριθμούς (8-10.000 άνδρες). σε κάθε περίπτωση η δύναμη των δύο πασάδων ήταν σημαντική. Το αριθμητικό τους δε πλεονέκτημα πολλαπλασιαζόταν από το γεγονός ότι διέθεταν και μεγάλο αριθμό ιππέων, αλλά και πυροβολικό.
«Συνεννοηθέντες οι δύο πασάδες εσυνάχθησαν όλοι εις τας Πάτρας και εις τας 9 Μαρτίου έγιναν τρις κολώνες (φάλαγγες) μια κατά των Πατρέων στη θέση Κυνηγού, η δε άλλη εις την μέσην κατ’ ευθείαν στο Γεροκομειό, η δε τρίτη στο κάτω μέρος του Γεροκομειού στις σταφίδες (ληνός)», αναφέρει ο Πλαπούτας. Οι Τούρκοι λοιπόν σχημάτισαν τρεις φάλαγγες εφόδου και κινήθηκαν για να επιτεθούν κατά τον Ελλήνων ρίχνοντας το βάρος τους στην περιοχή του Γεροκομείου.
Η τουρκική επίθεση αιφνιδίασε τους Έλληνες. Οι μαχόμενοι στη θέση Κυνηγού υποχώρησαν πιεζόμενοι και οι Τούρκοι έφτασαν στη μονή Γηροκομείου και την πολιόρκησαν. Επίσης το σώμα του Γενναίου υποχρεώθηκε σε υποχώρηση και κατέφυγε στον πύργο του Σαϊταγά. Το τουρκικό σχέδιο φάνηκε αρχικά να αποδίδει. Οι Τούρκοι πλήττοντας τους Έλληνες με το ισχυρό στο ισχυρό πέτυχαν, χάρη στην αριθμητική τους υπεροχή, να διασπάσουν, ουσιαστικά, την ελληνική διάταξη στο ισχυρότερό της σημείο.
Ο Κολοκοτρώνης αμέσως διέταξε τον Πλαπούτα και τον Ζαΐμη να σπεύσουν προς ενίσχυση των αποκλεισμένων στο μοναστήρι και στον πύργο Ελλήνων. Ωστόσο η παρουσία του τουρκικού ιππικού παρέλυε κάθε κίνηση. Έτσι φαινόταν πως η μάχη ήταν χαμένη οριστικά για τους Έλληνες. Ο Κολοκοτρώνης όμως είχε διαφορετική άποψη.
Μόνος του κινήθηκε έφιππος από το Σαραβάλι για να σταματήσει τον διαφαινόμενο πανικό και να ανασυντάξει τους Έλληνες. Σιγά – σιγά πάντως έπεφτε το σκοτάδι το οποίο αποτέλεσε σημαντικό σύμμαχο των καταπονημένων ελληνικών τμημάτων. Ο δε Κολοκοτρώνης πέραν από άξιος στρατηγός στο πεδίο της μάχης αποδείχθηκε και μαιτρ των ψυχολογικών επιχειρήσεων!
Ανεβαίνοντας σε ένα λοφίσκο κοντά στο χωριό Ρωμανού και καθώς είχε σκοτεινιάσει εντελώς, ο Κολοκοτρώνης άρχισε να φωνάζει:«Ετσάκισαν οι Τούρκοι»! Το αποτέλεσμα ήταν εκπληκτικό. Οι Έλληνες εμψυχώθηκαν και οι Τούρκοι, πολλοί εκ των οποίων ήξεραν ελληνικά, πανικοβλήθηκαν και άρχισαν να φεύγουν άτακτα έναντι ενός ανύπαρκτου κινδύνου, ενώ ήταν ουσιαστικά νικητές!
Σε λίγο ο Γιουσούφ και ο Μεχμέτ είχαν χάσει εντελώς τον έλεγχο των ανδρών τους άλλοι εκ των οποίων υποχώρησαν πανικόβλητοι μέχρι το Ρίο ενώ οι περισσότεροι επέστρεψαν στην ασφάλεια των τειχών του φρουρίου της Πάτρας. Οι δύο Τούρκοι πασάδες μόλις σώθηκαν και κατέφυγαν επίσης στο φρούριο.
Η νίκη των Ελλήνων, οφειλόμενη αποκλειστικά στον Κολοκοτρώνη, ήταν μεγάλη. Οι συνολικές απώλειες των Τούρκων, υπολογίζονται σε 1.000 νεκρούς, τραυματίες και αιχμαλώτους. Η δύναμη των Γιουσούφ και Μεχμέτ ήταν πάντως μάλλον τυχερή τελικά διότι αν οι Έλληνες που βρισκόταν στη μονή του Γηροκομείου και στον πύργο του Σαϊταγά πραγματοποιούσαν έξοδο θα τους είχαν αφανίσει. Η ήττα καταρράκωσε το ηθικό των Τούρκων που δεν αποτόλμησαν νέα έξοδο, παρά το γεγονός ότι εξακολουθούσαν πάντα να υπερέχουν αριθμητικά των Ελλήνων.
Αισχρές ίντριγκες
Παρά τη μεγάλη αυτή νίκη όμως στη μάχη του Σαραβαλίου, όπως έμεινε γνωστή, ο Κωλέττης αποφάσισε να υπονομεύσει κάθε προσπάθεια του Κολοκοτρώνη. Ο Κωλέττης όχι μόνο δεν έλυνε τα προβλήματα που παρουσιάζονταν αλλά έφτασε στο σημείο να διατάξει τον Κολοκοτρώνη να εγκαταλείψει την πολιορκία της Πάτρας και να μεταβεί με τις δυνάμεις του στη δυτική Στερεά για να ενισχύσει τους επαναστάτες εκεί. Δηλαδή ούτε λίγο, ούτε πολύ, ο υπουργός Στρατιωτικών ζητούσε από τον Γέρο να διαγράψει όλες τις μέχρι τότε επιτυχίες του και να πάει στην Στερεά, αφήνοντας πίσω του περί τους 12.000 Τούρκους επί του άξονα επικοινωνιών του!
Η διαταγή του Κωλέττη δεν χρίζει καν ανάλυσης αλλά είναι ενδεικτική του άθλου πνεύματος του φατριασμού που κυριαρχούσε στους κόλπους των Ελλήνων, ώστε να μην ορρωδούν ακόμα και έναντι της σωτηρίας αυτής καθαυτής της πατρίδας προκειμένου να επιτύχουν την εξουδετέρωση του επίφοβου κατ’ αυτούς Γέρου.
Ο Κολοκοτρώνης, με ψυχραιμία, απάντησε στον Κωλέττη πως «πρέπει πρώτα να σβύσουμε την φωτιά που είναι μέσα και έπειτα να υπάγης και εις βοήθεια του γειτόνου σου». Ο Κωλέττης εξοργίστηκε με την επιστολή του Κολοκοτρώνη και του απεύθυνε νέα έγγραφη διαταγή κατηγορώντας τον μάλιστα για απείθεια έναντι της κυβέρνησης! Τότε ο Κολοκοτρώνης αφήνοντας επικεφαλής τον Πλαπούτα αποφάσισε να μεταβεί προσωπικά στην Κόρινθο για να «ίδη τι πράγμα είναι η Κυβέρνηση και τι μυαλό έχει», κατά τον Φωτάκο.
Ο Γέρος φοβούμενος για την προσωπική του ασφάλεια κινήθηκε συνοδευόμενος από 80 πιστούς του άνδρες. Πλησιάζοντας στην Κόρινθο ο Κωλέττης του έστειλε μήνυμα να μην εισέλθει στην πόλη με τη φρουρά του διαταγή που ο Κολοκοτρώνης αγνόησε.
Όταν ο στρατηγός εισήλθε στην πόλη τον οδήγησαν, με εντολή της κυβέρνησης, να καταλύσει σε ένα ερειπωμένο οίκημα με σκοπό να τον εξευτελίσουν. Η φιλοτιμία του Γέρου δεν άντεξε άλλο και αμέσως εγκατέλειψε την Κόρινθο και βάδισε προς την Τριπολιτσά. Στο Ζευγολατιό όμως τον πρόλαβε ο Κωλέττης και με δυσκολία τον έπεισε να επιστρέψει στην Κόρινθο. Τελικά επετράπη στον Κολοκοτρώνη να συνεχίσει την πολιορκία της Πάτρας όπου ο Πλαπούτας είχε καταφέρει, με δυσκολία, να αποκρούσει μια ακόμα απόπειρα εξόδου των Τούρκων, οι οποίοι επιχείρησαν να εκμεταλλευτούν την απουσία του Γέρου του Μωριά.
Η κυβέρνηση όμως, αν και αποδέχτηκε, θεωρητικά, να επιτρέψει στον Κολοκοτρώνη να συνεχίσει την πολιορκία, στην πραγματικότητα άρχισε να τον υπονομεύει ακόμα χειρότερα από πριν αρνούμενη να τον ενισχύσει με άνδρες, χρήματα ή εφόδια. Ο Κολοκοτρώνης αυτοσχεδιάζοντας κατάφερε να παρατείνει την πολιορκία και μάλιστα επιχείρησε να έρθει σε συνεννόηση με τους πολιορκημένους επίσης Λαλαίους Τούρκους ώστε να αποχωρήσουν από την πόλη αποδυναμώνοντας τη φρουρά.
Αντίθετα η κυβέρνηση σχημάτισε μια νέα δύναμη υπό τον Κανέλο Δεληγιάννη στην οποία ανέθεσε την εκστρατεία στη δυτική Στερεά. Με τη δικαιολογία αυτή όλες οι ενισχύσεις και οι πόροι κατευθύνονταν προς τον Δεληγιάννη ενώ στον Κολοκοτρώνη δεν στέλνονταν τίποτα. Και σα να μην έφτανε αυτό στους καπετάνιους και τους στρατιώτες του έρχονταν διαταγές βάσει των οποίων έπρεπε να φύγουν από το «στρατόπεδο της Πάτρας» απειλούμενοι πως αν δεν υπάκουαν η κυβέρνηση θα δήμευε το 1/3 των περιουσιακών τους στοιχείων. Έτσι απέναντι στους 12.000 πολιορκημένους Τούρκους της Πάτρας απέμεινε ο πολιορκητής Κολοκοτρώνης με 600 μόλις άνδρες!
Αντιλαμβανόμενος το μάταιο της προσπάθειας διέλυσε επισήμως το στρατόπεδο του Σαραβλίου, στις 23 Ιουνίου 1822 και κινήθηκε προς την Τριπολιτσά. «Σκοπός τους ήταν να μην πάρω την Πάτρα και να μου σηκώσουν την δύναμη την στρατιωτική», αναφέρει στα απομνημονεύματά του. Μετά την αποχώρηση του Κολοκοτρώνη ο%B