These criteria were taken into account for obtaining of company captaincies. In the times of Felipe II, 10 or 12 years of service were required and to go through all the lower sections of the ranks. The system had certain exceptions:the nobles had more facilities for promotion due to their status, as well as those who had proven their worth in some outstanding feat of arms.
That cursus honorum It was presented before the War Council through a memorial, backed by letters of recommendation from superiors, testimonies from fellow soldiers, war wounds and even the services of a relative or ancestor. It was a process controlled by the Crown that ensured that only the best could reach a rank of vital importance, since the captains were in charge of recruiting new companies.
Unfortunately, this meritocratic system It didn't take long for it to deteriorate. The population stagnation[i], the loss of attractiveness of the military career, the increasingly numerous open fronts and the lack of monetary resources of the Royal Treasury, made it impossible for the Crown to gather enough troops. It was necessary to delegate part of the recruitment to private entities (nobles, cities and oligarchs), asentistas with local contacts and economic resources who recruited, armed and placed soldiers at their expense in exchange for certain benefits.
In general, these consisted of a captain's license accompanied by a supply by which the king certified that that person was fit for command even if he did not meet the requirements. The offices and supplies of the rest of the company's officers were also included, documents that would be sold to the highest bidder to relatives and/or members of the client network of the private recruiter.
Through this recruitment at cost, the Monarchy lost control over the enlistment and mobilization of its armies, in which a whole venal[ii] system began to take root where the Officership fell into the hands of those who could pay more money and not the most experienced veterans. This "commercial process" of men for honors, highly criticized by the War Council and by military writers, revealed a "hunger for privileges" of the local elites, who saw in the levies a quick way to ennoble themselves or to increase their titles.
The opportunities were favored with the declaration of war in France in 1635 and the Revolt of Catalonia, which led to an increase in the economic and military needs of the Crown, which sought alleviate them through the establishment or increase of taxes and the creation of the Habits Board.[iii]
Living with venality, however, there continued to be a promotion based, at least partially, on merit and combat experience. Such could be the case of Alonso de Mercado and Villacorta.
The military career of Alonso de Mercado and Villacorta
Alonso was born in Olmedo (Valladolid) into a family of hidalgos in 1620. Son of Luis de Mercado y Quiñones and María Vázquez de Menchaca y Villacorta, he lost his father at age 9, being his older brother, Jacinto Antonio de Mercado, the heir to the mayorazgo. It is very possible that at that point in his life he was left in charge of his paternal uncle, Gregorio de Mercado y Quiñones, who served in Naples, Milan, Navarra and Catalonia for 28 years[iv] and who was surely his godfather in the office of weapons.
This part of Alonso's life was recorded in a list of merits written in 1671. According to this document, the first time he participated in a battle was when he was 16 years old, as Spunky soldier in the invasion of Labort. Two years later he had already fought against the French troops in the siege of Leucata, on the border of Irún, in the rescue of the castle of Maya and in the town of Laredo.
Unfortunately, the list does not mention which units he fought in or if he excelled in combat, but it does mention that he was promoted to lieutenant and then captain of cuirassiers. This promotion was recorded in a patent dated December 7, 1639, in which he was entrusted with raising and directing a company of 60 cuirass horses.[v]
Given that at that time Alonso only had three of the five years of service required to be a captain[vi], there is the possibility that his uncle or even his brother they had interceded in his favor or, perhaps, that he bought the appointment.
Although the reasons for his promotion are unknown, it seems that he did not last long as a captain of cuirassiers, since the list places him in 1640, at the beginning of the Reapers' War, with a company of dragons in the Fraga area. In one of the patrols, Alonso was wounded and arrested along with his unit in an ambush near Lleida, from where he was transferred to the Barcelona public jail. There he remained a year until being exchanged for other prisoners, rejoining the army in 1642.
A letter written in Zaragoza on May 19, 1643 by Carlos Bonières, baron of Auchy and overseer of the Council of War, certifies this event:Alonso joined the company of the Count Luna of the Prince's Regiment in April 1642 and was promoted to governor of the unit on 9 September. Apparently he only held the position for two months, at which time he went to La Rioja.
His next participation was as cavalry captain in the taking of Monzón (Huesca), in 1643. The testimony that attested to his participation in the event was that of Álvaro de Quiñones , commander of Aguilarejo and Lieutenant General of the Cavalry Battalion of the Orders who, in another letter dated in Zaragoza on April 18, 1644, said that Alonso had served in his company for a year
After Monzón, Alonso fought in different cavalry units in the campaigns of Lérida, Balaguer, Llorens or Montblach. In the aforementioned narration, these episodes were recorded in more detail than the previous ones:
The siege and seizure of Barcelona put an end to 16 years of fighting, thanks to which Alonso was awarded a habit of Santiago (1647) and the government of an encomienda in Tucumán (1653), continuing services to the Crown in the Indies until his death in 1681.[vii]
Like private recruiters and asentitas, Alonso used military service as a tool for both social and professional promotion. However, and in the absence of more exhaustive studies of this period of his life (8), the testimonies provided support the hypothesis that, although he acquired the captain's license in a venal way and without meeting the requirements, the rest of the honors were earned by through armed service to the Crown and not through financial outlay.
This is an example of the weight that meritocracy still had within the Austrian army, although venal practices continued to gain strength during the reign of Charles II. By 1680, recruitment "at cost" was a generalized fact and the distribution of blank patents and supplies an abusive act during the Nine Years' War (1689-1697), activities whose main harms were the professionalism and effectiveness of the troops.
Notes
[i] According to I. A. A. Thompson, the demographic growth of Castile suffered a severe negative impact due to the fact that the military campaigns of the 16th century absorbed 9.35% of all the male births in Spain. It should also be taken into account that three quarters of these soldiers were single under 25 years of age and that many of them died on campaign, so the population of childbearing age was lost (Thompson, 2003:35-36).
[ii] Venality was not unique to the military. It also took root in other branches of the administration, such as the Accounting Offices of the Treasury Council. For this topic see:Andújar Castillo, F. (2018):“Businessmen and public officials:venal access to the positions of the Treasury Council in the 17th century”, in Studium, magisterium et amicitia : tribute to Professor Agustín González Enciso . Pamplona:Eunate, pp. 169-176.
[iii] Through this body, habits of the military orders of Santiago, Calatrava, Alcántara and Montesa were granted to those captains who accredited four years of service and who contributed 20 veteran soldiers or 10 officers reformed for the Catalonian front along with their salary for one year. The other possibility was to commute the number of soldiers by the amount of money that the recruitment process would cost plus pay. The activity of the Habits Board ceased in 1642 due to the decrease in the number of applicants, since they had the possibility of obtaining habits through other boards or by buying them from an individual (Jiménez Moreno, 2009:157-172).
[iv] In Naples, Gregorio de Mercado was second lieutenant of infantry, lieutenant of horse arquebusiers of the company of D. García de Pimentel, governor of the guard of the Marquis of Tavara and dragon horse captain This was his last position, in a company of the Kingdom of Navarre with which he participated in the invasions of southern France between 1636 and 1637, being discharged due to illness that same year. His retirement only lasted until 1640, when he was granted a habit of the Order of Santiago to fight as a captain in the Cavalry Battalion of the Orders (Jiménez Moreno, 2011:561-790).
[v] This document is kept in a private archive in the city of Malaga.
[vi] Royal ordinance of June 28, 1632:“…And if there is any illustrious Knight, in whom virtue, courage, and prudence concur, it may be admitted to the election of Captains, as long as he has served in the War for six effective years, or at least five …”. Gutiérrez Carretero, M. (2017):"Compilation of the military ordinances of the Austrias". Military History Magazine , No. Extra 1, p. 417.
[vii] This whole period has been treated in:Lizondo Borda, M. (1941):Historia del Tucumán (Siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII) , Tucuman; Figueroa, F. R. (1986):Compendium of history and geography of Salta , Madrid:Plus Ultra; and Rubio Durán, F. A. (1999):Punas, valleys and ravines. Land and work in colonial Tucumán, 17th century, Seville:Provincial Council.
Primary sources
- Certification of the genealogy of Alonso de Mercado and Vázquez de Menchaca for their admission to the Order of Santiago in 1647. RAH, 9/324, fº 15. Available at:http://bibliotecadigital.rah.es/dgbrah/ es/query/resultados_ocr.cmd?buscar_cabecera=Search&id=30905&tipoResultados=BIB&presentation=mosaic&position=1&forma=file
- List of merits of Alonso de Mercado and Villacorta. A. G. I./23.15.121//INDIFFERENT,121,N.148. Available at:http://pares.mcu.es/ParesBusquedas/servlets/Control_servlet?accion=3&txt_id_desc_ud=239348&fromagenda=N
- Letter issued in Zaragoza, attesting to the service rendered by the lieutenant of the company of Count Luna of the regiment of Prince Don Alonso de Mercado. Cortes Aragon Library. Signature:D141. Available at:http://www.cortesaragon.es/fondoHistorico/i18n/consulta/resultados_busqueda.cmd?id=12376&materia_numcontrol=&autor_numcontrol=&posicion=1&forma=ficha
- Certification issued in Zaragoza of the good services of Captain Don Alonso de Mercado. Cortes Aragon Library. Signature:D142. Available at:http://www.cortesaragon.es/fondoHistorico/i18n/consulta/resultados_busqueda.cmd?id=12376&materia_numcontrol=&autor_numcontrol=&posicion=2&forma=ficha
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