On October 4 around 10 a.m., after an exhausting night march, the 1st B.E.P., the remains of the 11th Tabor and the survivors of the Feuillet companies reached a hilltop south of 765. Faced with these events, Lepage abandoned his his decision is reinforced by the arrival of Commander Delcros. After having wandered alone with two goumiers all night, the commander has managed to reach the CP. He can report on the position of the B.E.P. and the extermination of his Tabor.
Lepage then makes the decision that will seal the fate of the weapons.He gives the order to take refuge in the hole of Coc Xa:a deep basin with steep sides, strewn with scree A chance for the Viets:when Charton has joined Lepage in this mousetrap, they will be able to massacre everyone. But the leader of the "Bayard" group believes that Coc Xa is the only place, in this jungle, where one can defend and "hold" until the Charton column arrives . Ironically, having gone to the rescue of Charton, Lepage now only awaits his salvation from him. In the meantime, he displays his device.
This same October 4, the Charton group continues to progress. Slowly, very slowly. The 3 'Tabor opens the road to kilometer 22. He has simply forgotten that kilometer 18, which commands 22 is already occupied by a company of partisans. “I had not reminded him of this fact, notes Colonel Charton, certain that he was informed of it”. Precious time wasted.
That same morning a radio message from the Z.F.N.E. sent on the 3rd, but only transmitted on the 4th "for I don't know what reason" (Charton) warned the commander of the group that the Lepage column was stationed at hills 760 and 765, 2 or 3 kilometers south-west of Dong Khé, and asks him to join her as quickly as possible by the track of Nam Nang-Quang Liet.
"I ordered the engineers to destroy the rolling stock and the guns, and the units to hit, by passing at the height of the cars, half a unit of fire and a day of provisions”. This order, notes Charton, was poorly executed, especially by the partisans, which made the column waste time. Another loss of time at kilometer 22 to look for the entrance to the track that no one knew. This track had not been used, even by the Viets, for years. Waste of time looking, in vain, for guides among the partisans. Charton gives the order to follow the river. According to the map, the track should go along it.
Slow, difficult progress, without radio link. “As of October 4, explains Charton, the liaisons had proved to be almost impossible. Radio sessions were no longer respected. In the thick jungle, everyone followed as best he could the one in front of him, having only one concern, not to lose sight of him. The leaders now only commanded the groups that were very close to them, and with great difficulty the rest of their unit. The middle of the column did not know what was going on in front or behind; perhaps we were even following a stray column.
“The radio links could only really be resumed at the halts, during the night. That night of the 4th, it was decided, in order to speed up the movement, that the leading units would no longer open, but would guard themselves by patrols sent to dangerous places.
“October 5 , the 3/3' R.E.I. progressed in very difficult terrain and groped to find the pass which was to open access to the Quang Liet valley.
"With the commander of 3' Tabor, I joined the commander of 3' R.E.I. to help guide him. After many difficulties, because the horizon was blocked less than ten meters by trees and bush, we finally discovered the pass.
“Barely the 3/3’ R.E.I. when he emerged into the Quang Liet valley he was stopped by fire from individual automatic weapons that seemed to come from the wooded hills dominating the valley to the east. I sent contact patrols to determine the strength of the adversary. While the 3/3’ R.E.I. would stare at the enemy, I would use the 3rd Tabor along the ridge lines which dominate the valley to the west to continue the advance by outflanking the Viets”.
The main body of the column continued its progress. The men are exhausted. At nightfall, for the first time radio contact is made with the Lepage group. Charton then discovers the seriousness of the situation.
Meanwhile, in the Coc Xa hole, the bulk of the "Bayard" group is regaining strength. Invaluable advantage, there is water. We quench our thirst, we count the numbers, we regroup, we wait for Charton.
Lepage asks Langson for a parachute drop of food and ammunition. Greeted by enemy automatic weapons, the Junkers drop their cargo too far, among the Viets. Everything seems to smile on the enemy
The B.E.P. arrived on the heights which dominate Coc Xa. Joined by survivors of the 11th Tabor, the legionnaires prepare to descend towards the valley which leads to the basin; a message from Lepage, who has changed his mind, orders them to stay put. Because, in Coc Xa, hope is reborn; overnight, Lepage was able to get in touch with Charton. Cao Bang's group will be there during the day, no later than dawn on the 6th. It was about time.
In reality, the noose is tightening. Giap massed twenty to thirty thousand men around Coc Xa. The strafing of the hunt is useless. The enemy buries himself, hides; the planes pass overhead, see nothing, touch no one. Thirty thousand men against two exhausted columns. The end is near. The enemy heavy artillery - a gift from the Chinese - is ready. Soon it will come into play.
But Charton is coming. Lepage orders Segrétain to descend into the valley and set foot on the pitons opposite. Charton must come this way. The B.E.P. will receive it. Then begins the night descent, by a path where a goat would not pass. Endlessly harassed, the legionnaires march blindly. We see nothing. Men fall into the void.