Ancient history

Meuse-Argonne 1918:Clemenceau accuses the Americans of stalling

After having weighed and matured the lessons delivered by poorly coordinated actions, Pershing deemed it necessary to reorganize his army. He took sanctions:heads rolled, three division commanders and a corps commander were relieved of their duties.

Some of these decisions were controversial; the American general demanded energy and enthusiasm from his men and eliminated those who lacked the slightest bit of it.
He also had a very particular way of settling contentious cases:"If men run away in front of the enemy, the officers have the duty to put right there order immediately, and, if it is necessary, to cut down on the spot those which are guilty of a behavior so shameful. On this subject, there is no need for written orders; all young officers must know that they are bound to do what is necessary to prevent any desertion. »
Liggett, on the other hand, was trying to temporize:he had to give his men time to recover.

But the French were eager to see the American offensive continue; Hurtful words were spoken about this apparent slowdown in operations.
The President of the Council, Georges Clemenceau, did not spare his criticisms. He wrote to Foch:"I would be a criminal if I allowed the French army to bear the weight of the battle alone indefinitely, and if I did not do everything in my power to ensure that an allied army hastened to its aid, or put in condition to fulfill the military mission for which it is intended...

Our valiant American allies, who are eager for action and unanimously recognized as great soldiers, marked time immediately after their leap forward on the first day. No one can claim that these brave troops are unusable:they are simply unused. »
Foch answered in more moderate terms. It is, however, certain that Pershing was the object of considerable pressure to persuade him to resume the offensive, in defiance of the state of his troops. But he was not one to give in easily, and Liggett, for his part, was determined not to commit his troops until they were ready.

The American Expeditionary Force carried out very few operations during the rest of the month, except for the bloody attack on Grandpré by the 78th Division.

As the Americans reorganized, the Germans also took stock. Ludendorff, a genius tactician, winner of the Russians, had been shaken by the massive arrival of troops from across the Atlantic. By September 28, he had guessed that the game was lost. His last hope was that General Max von Gallwitz, commanding the army group opposing the Americans, could hold out enough to avoid complete defeat before an eventual armistice. The Germans were exhausted. Lieutenant General Wellmann, who had fought with the 1st Reserve Corps against the Americans, sadly pointed out that his adversaries "had their nerves still intact, were ready, eager to fight and full of courage".

The Allies quickly realized the situation thanks to the letters they intercepted. A German company commander wrote on October 16:“Closed prospects everywhere you look. Has all of this really been for nothing? Such a sad ending! I lose all hope; one can only hope for an early end to the war; there is nothing left to save. »

This state of mind was established in Germany itself. A soldier’s wife wrote on October 27:“It is becoming evident that the dawn of peace is approaching. And we dare cherish the hope that this war, the most hideous of all, this abominable massacre, this shame and this derision for all humanity, which lowers us lower than savages, whatever the level of our so-called culture , will end one day and that we will be able to consider ourselves as human beings again. »
For the German soldier, there could be no respite. As early as October 10, Ludendorff ordered Gallwitz to "bring to the front line all units capable of being engaged in battle".

Major-General Baron von Quadt, who commanded a division opposed to the Americans, explained to his troops on October 21 that a halt was neither possible. nor desirable:“Given the circumstances, this would result in the immediate dispatch of our division to another point on the front, and most likely, to a different place than this. At the time of the Allied attack, the Class of 1919 had, for a long time. been mobilized across the Rhine and food was scarce on the front, on the German side.