Be that as it may, from July 26 the preparatory exercises for the landing went well on the island of Koro in Fiji and lasted four days. D-Day had been postponed to August 4 and then August 7. Aerial bombardments, naval artillery shelling, beach landings, air support, ship-to-shore and air-to-ground attack exercises... all these preparations were quite chaotic.
But time passed. On the morning of August 7, Australian lookouts perched on the hilltops saw the sea off Guadalcanal cover itself with the strongest amphibious attack force ever mustered. In boats of 36 men, thousands of marines approached the beaches in successive waves.
To everyone's surprise, the Japanese resistance was non-existent:the attackers had obtained a total surprise. Had they encountered any opposition, land, sea or air, the outcome of this first hastily prepared Allied landing operation would probably have been disastrous.
However, by the evening of the 7th, the troops were on the ground, the stocks of supplies were piled up in a disorderly fashion on the beaches, the transport sections had blindly plunged into the jungle and the soldiers were wandering a little haphazard, exhausted by the tropical heat, dazed and completely clueless. The fierce struggle for Guadalcanal which was to last six months. began in an ominous calm.
If there was no combat in Guadalcanal during the first 24 hours, it was otherwise on the neighboring islands. On the big island, General Vandegrift had chosen - and events proved him right - a landing point where his men would not encounter any Japanese opposition. On the smaller islands, he could not expect such luck. So it was against these that he sent his most seasoned units under the command of experienced officers.
Colonel Merrit Edson of the 1st Marine Commando Battalion charged with taking Tulagi, told his men to lighten up anything but combat gear. “Don't worry about the food, Japs need to eat like everyone else. All you have to do is take their food from them. A quick landing technique allowed them to land on the island before noon, but the fierce Japanese resistance did not allow them to take the whole of the island before the end of the day. The following night, the Japanese counter-attacked, with heavy mortars, grenade launchers, and heavy and light machine guns. Four times they rushed on the commandos and four times they were repulsed. The Japanese garrison thus lost almost all of its manpower, but it took the commandos almost all day of August 8 to eliminate the survivors.
The fight was even tougher on the islet of Gavutu. The position had been bombarded by planes and boats; however the paratroopers quickly realized, in their progression, that these bombardments had no effect on the underground shelters and the caves where the Japanese were entrenched. The paratroopers were greeted by an avalanche of fire. Unit commanders called for support from the fleet's heavy guns, but the depths were unknown in the vicinity of the islet and the warships could not get close enough for their shots to be of any size. great precision. The losses were appalling among the paratroopers even before they could secure a beachhead.
On the neighboring islet of Tanambogo, connected to Gavutu by a road, things went even worse:the assault troops and their boats were cut to pieces by the Japanese before they reached land. Reinforcements were called in and put in place on the morning of 8 August. The Japanese were then literally crushed and extricated from the caves and shelters of Gavutu, but the problem of Tanambogo remained unsolved. Before venturing onto the causeway, the American command requested two air attacks to weaken the defense of the islet, but none of them were effective. The most affected were the forward American assault elements from Gavutu, which received short-fired bombs. In desperation, the troop commander ordered the destroyer Buchanan to dump her ammunition on the Japanese. The effect of this fire was devastating and within minutes the assault sections were able to control Tanambogo.
At Guadalcanal the Americans had still not encountered any Japanese, but their advance towards the field aircraft was very slow. It took all the energy of General Vandegrift for the first patrols to finally reach the runway, late in the evening of August 8. The infrastructure specialists and their protection troops had fled into the jungle as soon as the shelling ended. The surprise of the Japanese seemed to have been complete. Everywhere he saw, littering the ground, the signs of a hasty flight:uniforms, shirts, caps, chopsticks for meals, helmets, mosquito nets, guns, teacups, bowls of rice still half full.
It had taken the Americans much longer than expected to reach the airfield. Serious shortcomings had appeared in the speed and organization of unloading. Moreover, the heavy casualties suffered by the marines at Tulagi, Gavutu and Tanambogo - sometimes more than 20% of the engaged strength - had shown what a resilient and resourceful combatant the Japanese soldier could be, even crushed under numbers and under the shells.
Eventually the airfield of Guadalcanal and the islands closest to that coast were in American hands_ Despite delays, shortcomings and errors, the operation had achieved its objective of denying the Japanese a base from which they could cut Allied supply lines and isolate Australia. There was great relief in Australia, Washington and London. But
feeling was not to last for, late August 8-9, a Japanese crusading squadron ripped Admiral Crutchey's allied naval forces to pieces, and the transport boats were forced to withdraw.
By the end of the afternoon of August 9, Admiral Turner's last ship had disappeared and the Marines were on their own.