On September 12 at noon, Vandegrift knew that his idea was good:the Japanese bombers stalked not on the runway of Henderson Field but on the relief which borders it to the south. Shortly after dark, a cruiser and three Japanese destroyers opened fire on the ridges, and as soon as the firing ceased, Kawaguchi's troops attempted the assault. They succeeded in encircling a platoon of marines, which was however able to fight their way to the friendly positions.
At dawn, the Americans assumed that the purpose of the previous action had been to test their device. Their morale would have been better if they had known that Kawaguchi was planning to take the decision that night. His idea was to attack the ridge with three battalions while his other units would defend the western and eastern flanks of the perimeter. But a long and arduous walk in the jungle had exhausted them, and had strained his communications, which hampered his control of the operation. Despite everything, his attack was as frenzied as Ichiki's. Two of his battalions (nearly 2,000 men) rushed down the slopes. The marine mortars, well deflected, sent a hail of shells on the waves of attack, as fast as the gunners could reload the white-hot tubes.
Marine artillery, in position behind the commandos, fired salvo after salvo. On the other side, seven Japanese destroyers bombarded Henderson Field and kept it under constant rocket illumination. On the ridge, the marines gave way but did not yield and the Japanese eventually fell back. Shortly after, they returned to the assault with the same ferocity. Once again the defenses were chipped but not broken and the Japanese had to withdraw.
Two hours later, after a round of mortar fire cut the Marines' lines of communication with Vandegrift and their artillery support, the Japanese were able to advance to within 1,000 yards of Henderson Field. They were driven back after one of the bloodiest hand-to-hand combats in Guadalcanal's history. They launched two more assaults before dawn, though with less impetuosity, and when the fighters from Henderson Field began to shell the edges of the jungle below the ridge, Kawaguchi resigned himself to falling back. His losses exceeded 1,200 men killed, wounded and missing. Starving, plagued by disease, the remnants of the 35th Brigade fought their way through the jungle for eight deadly days to Point Cruz, west of Henderson Field. They had no other armament than their rifles.
Commandos and paratroopers had also suffered badly. Of some 750 men landed on August 7, the commandos had lost 234 and of the 377 paratroopers, 212 were killed and wounded. But then it was certain that the marines could hold Guadalcanal.
The G.Q.G. of Tokyo did not share this point of view. The 38th Division, seasoned in Hong-Kong, Java and Sumatra, received the order to reach the South Pacific under the command of General C.A. Hyakutake who commanded the XVIIth Army. Simultaneously General Maruyama's 2nd Division, already there, was to be transported to Guadalcanal. All operations against Port Moresby were to be suspended to concentrate the full potential of the three Armies on the recapture of Guadalcanal. General Hyakutake transferred his HQ to the island where he had at his disposal a force of 20,000 men, with heavy artillery (one regiment plus three batteries), a mortar battalion and a tank company. For the next six weeks, Admiral Tanaka's "rat races," dubbed "Tokyo's Night Express" by the Americans, were busy and the Marines were bombed every night.
Fortunately Vandegrift also received some reinforcements:the 7th Marine Regiment, an artillery battalion, motorized transport companies, signals personnel and, later, the 164th infantry regiment of more than 6 000 men, bringing its strength to more than 23,000 men. Equally essential to him, the reinforcement of Henderson Field was considerable.
On paper, Vandegrift's forces were formidable; in reality they were quite few. Although their losses did not exceed a thousand, the marines suffered in large numbers from malnutrition, dysentery, virulent infections, complete lack of comfort and rest. In fact, in any other theater of operations, more than a third of the force would have been declared unfit.
On October 23, the Japanese 2nd Division (some eight battalions, 5,600 men) attacked east of the perimeter with tank support.
A highly concentrated artillery fire halted the advance. Twenty-four hours later, General Maruyama attacked from the south, with the bulk of his troops, 7,000 men. For two days the Japanese stormed the slopes south of Henderson Field. At one point they even had an enclave inside the perimeter, and then, like Kawaguchi's brigade, they retreated into the jungle, decimated and exhausted, having lost 3,500 men.
The reason for the failure was once again the breakdown of communications among the Japanese. Progress through the Maruyama Jungle - begun on October 16 - had been slower and harder than expected. Artillery and mortars had to be abandoned, the attack postponed twice, but the second time the order did not reach the Japanese commander of the Matanikau sector. Instead of being launched simultaneously, the two assaults were conducted 24 hours apart. This allowed General Vandegrift to drive them back one after the other. The problem then for him and for his adversaries was to know what to do.
For the Americans, Vandegrift and Admiral Halsey, who had just succeeded Admiral Ghormley as commander of the zone, the answer was clear:it was time to go on the offensive and throw back into the sea what was left of the Japanese XVII Army. It was equally evident that the 1st Marine Division, in its current state, was no longer the ideal instrument for an offensive which would be long, hard and bloody. Fresh and numerous troops were needed. , after spending the month of November taking ground and reducing the most threatening Japanese outposts, in preparation for the future offensive, General Vandegrift and the 1st Marine Division were relieved in early December by the 2Y Infantry Division, the 2nd Marine Division and the "America" Division, together forming the XIV Corps, commanded by General Patch.
For the Japanese, the problem was deciding whether to keep trying to wrest Henderson Field from the Americans. Imperial HQ refused to concede defeat, fresh troops were drawn from across the Empire and assigned to the 17th Army. General de C.A. Sano's 28th Division moved to Guadalcanal to prepare for the final assault, the 4th, in mid-January 1943. But around November 15, a squadron of the American Naval Air Force succeeded at the cost of appalling losses to prevent a Japanese formation from bombing Henderson Airfield and destroying its planes on the ground. This heroic resistance saved the air base, and it was able to bludgeon the convoy of 11 transports, in which the Sano Division was heading for Guadalcanal. Six transport ships were sunk, one was immobilized and four ran aground on the beaches. Of the manpower of this division, only 2,000 men - without heavy equipment - were able to reach Guadalcanal.
This haemorrhage of men and means was unsustainable, and the Imperial HQ finally admitted it. Since August 7 the losses had been 65 warships and more than 800 aircraft. On December 31, 1942, the Emperor of Japan approved the order to withdraw the XVII Army from Guadalcanal.
General Hyakutake only reluctantly accepted this order. Its retreat to the east was an opportunity for the XIV Corps to know the value of the Japanese fighter, even starving and devoid of equipment. At no time between January and the beginning of February did the Americans succeed in disturbing the calculated rhythm of the evacuation. Between February 1 and 9, the destroyers of the "Tokyo Express" recovered at night the 11,000 survivors of the XVIIth Army, only a fraction of the troops who had come to drive the Americans into the sea, but a force still formidable and who would resume the fight.