The Treaty of Versailles drastically limited the German army. It would seem, therefore, that the Reichswehr command in the first half of the 1920s should live in constant fear of a potential Polish attack. None of these things. The Germans were sure that in the event of a war, they would win the final victory.
Wait a minute, something's wrong here. How could the German armed forces, which were three times weaker in number and devoid of heavy equipment, compete with the Polish Army, which had only just plundered the Red Army? Had the German military lost touch with reality after losing the war? Not at all.
Even though the Treaty of Versailles significantly limited Germany's military potential, the Reichswehr command was confident. The illustration shows a fragment of a painting by William Orpen showing the signing of the treaty.
It turns out that they knew very well about the problems plaguing our army at that time. What kind of troubles were we can find out by reading the work by professor Robert Citino entitled "Germany defends itself against Poland 1918-1933."
No weapons and poor training
The main source of information for the military from the Spree about the state of the Polish army was, of course, intelligence activities. As the American historian says in his book:
Reports from the German military intelligence clearly showed that Warsaw lacked faith in the offensive capabilities of the Polish armed forces. The results of the maneuvers and war games known to the Germans as a result of the activities of their agents proved that the Polish armed forces were invariably unfit for offensive operations.
Moreover, the interrogations of deserters were a perfect supplement to the data obtained by the intelligence, from which a very negative image of the Polish army emerged.
Soldiers of the 63rd Infantry Regiment in 1932. Perfectly uniformed and well fed. Ten years earlier - if we believe Stanisław Szlachta's testimony - the situation was completely different
For example, Stanisław Szlachta - a defector from the 63rd Toruń infantry regiment - stated that his unit lacked uniform weapons and that Russian, French, Czech and German rifles were used - a real nightmare for every quartermaster. Moreover, he emphasized that:
Ammunition is very scarce and not even issued to watchmen. Most of the clothing consists of English uniforms. The horses are good, but not enough of them. The 8th regiment has only 50 horses for 600 soldiers.
The vast majority of this regiment's wagons are harnessless, while the remainder have single horses instead of entire harnesses. The uniforms are lousy; there is a serious lack of footwear. Often soldiers serve barefoot on the assembly square . Food is insufficient. Soldiers receive two pounds [kilogram - author's note] bread a day, sometimes with a little jam.
After such an account, one should not be surprised that the Germans were not afraid of an attack from the east. Because how can you be afraid of an army that does not even have enough horses, not to mention footwear and food for soldiers?
Interrogators of the Nobility were even more interested in what he had to say about the morale of the Polish Army soldiers. And he stated neither less nor more that:
The relationship between the soldiers is terrible because those from Pomerania and Congress Poland do not agree on anything. About three weeks ago, officers from Congress Poland were expelled from the city by soldiers from Pomerania, led by officers from Greater Poland, because the former wanted to introduce corporal punishment.
Satisfied and confident officers of the 5th and 7th Reichswehr Divisions during the summer maneuvers in 1926. They are convinced that in the event of a war with Poland, victory will be on their side
Another defector, interrogated in 1921, previously serving in the 2nd squadron of the 15th Poznań Lancers Regiment, confirmed the words of the gentry. His testimony also contained information shedding light on the role of French officers assigned to Polish units. The report showed that:
French officers can be found in every company. The Polish company commander cannot take disciplinary measures himself, but must ask for permission from the French officer which usually increases the penalty twice.
There is no need to convince anyone that such a situation had a negative impact on the morale of the soldiers, and even worse, the officer cadre, whose authority was constantly undermined.
Bolsheviks and national minorities
As if all this was not enough, despite the conclusion of peace with the Bolsheviks in March 1921, it was still necessary to maintain a strong military contingent on the eastern border, which made it impossible to send larger forces to the west. Another pressing problem that ruled out a possible Polish offensive against the Weimar Republic in the first half of the 1920s was the issue of national minorities.
Some of them - for example, Germans or Ukrainians - were openly hostile to the Polish state. Additionally - as R. Citino writes - the presence of a large German community in the western voivodships of Poland increased the probability of hindering the activities of the Polish army in these areas by hostile people.
In the light of the data provided by the intelligence and information provided by deserters, it is easy to understand why the Germans in the first half of the 1920s did not actually take into account the situation in which Poland would declare war on them. They were convinced that our army, despite its numbers, was poorly trained and equipped and was not a worthy opponent for the Reichswehr. Was it true? Unfortunately, to a large extent, yes. Anyway, it is not surprising, after all, Poland has only just reborn after more than 120 years of captivity.
Source:
- Robert Citino, Germany defends itself against Poland 1918-1933 , Erica Publishing Institute, 2012