Why did the Commander-in-Chief write about his army that he preferred the state of "pissed-off f *** y than the state of good service"?
Late evening. Piłsudski calls an adjutant. She tells him to sit at the typewriter and write. The subordinate does not dare to dodge, although typing is not his strongest point. Piłsudski dictates quickly. Definitely. He knows what he wants to say. He is furious - not only because of the political situation. The year 1929 was a year of tough decisions, the elections did not go his way and now he really has no choice. He must finally deal with the opposition. For several days now, the street has been commenting on the bringing before the State Tribunal of Minister Czechowicz.
This is the challenge to the sanation. The words fall one after the other. Piłsudski does not pay attention to the fact that the keys are pressed much slower. Finally, after one round of corrections, the document is ready - sloppy and full of mistakes. Feverishly, Piłsudski quickly puts a signature and orders:"Send immediately". A few days later, the order is withdrawn, but the milk has already spilled. Rumors about him are starting to circulate in the army.
Already in the first paragraph we read that the military:"... becomes an ordinary public maiden, looking for love quarrels in various forests and hills, with no benefit to the war, except for the satisfaction of a quirky pindy" . It is hard to believe that such words were included in the official document submitted to the Chief of the General Staff, Deputy Ministers of Military Affairs and other senior officers. To this day, for many researchers, this order proves Piłsudski's complete military dilettantism.
But even the discoverer of the document, Marian Romeyko, who is very critical of Piłsudski and his military skills, while writing about the order, admits that his intentions were right. So what was that about? What were these intentions?
More important than cannons and rifles
The mild title does not portend a harsh tone and language. At first glance, "About Connectivity" gives the impression of a routine document that even staff members fall asleep by. The beginning does not suggest fireworks:"Communication in the army is the same weapon as a cannon, a machine gun [...] an ammunition car ..." and further:"Without communication there is no coordinated work of the army, there is no joining of bloody efforts to win and human blood pours free, it pours unnecessarily. ”
Probably every soldier would endorse these statements. Some, undoubtedly including Piłsudski himself, would say that these are mere truisms. The author of the order continues his thought and reminds that the primary duty of an officer is, firstly, to maintain communication with the superior, and secondly, with neighboring troops. Again, it's hard to disagree.
The text is based on the latest book by Maciej Gablankowski, "Piłsudski. A perverse portrait. Biography ”, which has just been released by the Znak publishing house.
The following items of the command discuss issues, it would seem technically. The Marshal strongly criticizes the manner in which the communications service was arranged. This is all the more strange as the order comes from 1929, that is, from the time when Piłsudski had full power over the Polish Army for at least three years.
Yet describes the organization of communications as "alchemical", thus emphasizing its too much separation from other troops. In addition, her immersion in technical techniques and "foul laboratories" causes - believes Piłsudski - that among the staff there is a belief that communication will be provided by itself , deus ex machina without any effort on the part of the officers. (By the way, it unambiguously suggests that his predecessors therefore organized the communication in this way, because buying expensive equipment from abroad could bring them tangible benefits.)
If his assessment was correct, intervention was needed. The army has to be shaken up. Hence the order.
Find out more: What did Piłsudski REALLY think about his generals? This one manuscript could have broken the Marshal's career
War experiences
Piłsudski's reflections on the role of communication stem directly from his wartime experiences. He could not, of course, write it in the order, but one of the essential elements of the victory was precisely the good use of technical shortcomings in the radio communication of the Bolsheviks. Polish radio intelligence quickly learned to read the enemy's cables, and excessive trust in technical means, instead of acting in favor of the Bolsheviks, worked in favor of the Poles.
The order also clearly shows that for him communication means not only sending messages, but most of all coordination. That is, both providing information and drawing correct conclusions as well as executing orders in accordance with the intentions of the superior.
Cavalry. This type of troops was, according to the Commander-in-Chief:"the ideal of a dream public girl, making love quarrels at different angles without purpose and need
Yet one of the main reasons for the Bolshevik defeat was precisely the lack of coordination between the northern and southern sections of the front. The inadequacies of communication were the source of future defeat. It was no different on the Polish side, and only - in Piłsudski's opinion - his own effort and the efforts of his officers made it possible to maintain communication as such. Moreover, communication and coordination require discipline. And the military prefers the "freaked-out state of the fuck than good soldier service".
The most criticized, however, was the conduct of the cavalry, which, after all, had spoiled Piłsudski's blood during the struggle with the Bolsheviks. The unconventional actions of Budyonny's horse army - which Piłsudski initially disregarded - almost led to a break in the front. This type of troops was, according to the Commander-in-Chief:"the ideal of a public dream girl, making love quarrels at various angles without purpose or need". Moreover: "our driving so far considers the greatest tradition of the former Russian driving, which was the most outstanding representative of this K *** iary direction". Piłsudski intended to devise special communication rules for driving.
The order was dispatched. More than 60 top military men got it. Though secret, news of it spread through word of mouth. Here someone showed it to someone, someone else told it. However, does this order really prove Piłsudski's military dilettance?
With good intentions…
What did Piłsudski want to achieve with this order and did he succeed? Undoubtedly, the thought that the coordination skills and communication system in the military needed to be improved was correct. These are the "right intentions" that Marian Romeyko wrote about. But did the Marshal adopt measures adequate to the goal? Gruber language and shocking phrases meant that this order was simply treated as a dictator's attack of anger and the connectivity problem he rightly raised was largely ignored. In other words, it has achieved nothing.
Józef Piłsudski had a great intuition as to what changes are needed, but his personality prevented him from achieving these goals. It has proved to be completely ineffective in managing the army as an institution in peacetime.
How profound has this been? Today, almost all historians agree that one of the most important causes of the September defeat was the catastrophic state of communications. In this case, good intentions were not enough.
The text is based on the latest book by Maciej Gablankowski, "Piłsudski. A perverse portrait. Biography ", which has just been released by the Znak publishing house.