The Battle of Bzura was described by the German general as "one of the greatest, most devastating battles of all time". The Poles surprised the Wehrmacht soldiers and for a moment it seemed that they had a chance to win. However, not everything went according to plan.
From the beginning of the September campaign, Tadeusz Kut Security was a supporter of giving the Germans a general battle. He managed to convince Władysław Bortnowski, the commander of the "Pomerania" Army, to undertake a joint offensive action.
The army of the latter, threatened from two sides, fought bloody battles in Bory Tucholskie, near Bydgoszcz and Nakło. The commander, however, broke down. "His role was, in fact, a passive observer of defeat," wrote Colonel Kirchmayer, deputy chief of the 3rd Division of the "Pomorze" Army Staff.
The plan to attack from the Bzura River was supported, however, by General Wacław Stachiewicz, Chief of the General Staff, who saw that it would allow for the preparation of the defense of Warsaw, Lublin and Lviv. Indeed - the Germans, who had already announced the seizure of the Polish capital to the world, had to withdraw from the suburbs to stop the offensive from Bzura. Having learned about everything, Marshal Śmigły tried to change the direction of the attack on Radom and further south-east. It was further evidence of his confusion. He was setting an impossible task for his generals.
First successes… and quick end of dreams
Meanwhile, Kutewka wanted to attack Sochaczew and Łowicz, and then retreat to Warsaw. On September 9, three Wielkopolska infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade went into action. The offensive took the Wehrmacht by surprise. The Poles drove the escaping Germans ahead of them, taking prisoners of war and acquiring equipment. Shaking off the first shock, the enemy threw reinforcements into the fight.
Thanks to the element of surprise, our troops inflicted heavy losses on the Germans in the first phase of the Battle of Bzura.
On September 10, two German infantry divisions came to the rescue, and the next day also the 16th Panzer Corps. Meanwhile, the Polish commander did not receive support. The remnants of the "Łódź" Army were no longer able to undertake operational activities, and the concentration of the "Prussia" reserve army, fatally commanded by Dąb-Biernacki, ended in a spectacular catastrophe.
It did not take long for the Poles to begin to be massacred by the raids of 800 bombers of the 1st and 4th German Air Fleets. Anti-aircraft artillery batteries fell silent due to lack of ammunition. The fate of the battle was determined by a panic attack to which Bortnowski succumbed again.
Well, when the 4th Infantry Division of general Józef Werobej passed Łowicz and was on its way to the German rear, the commander of Amia "Pomorze" received a false report about the approach of large armored forces to Sochaczew. Without confirmation of the diagnosis and without consulting Kutrzeb, he stopped the attack and ordered an escape behind the Bzura river.
So when the opportunity for victory emerged, the Poles began an idiotic and chaotic retreat. "I committed the greatest sin that on the second day of the war I did not put a bullet in Bortnowski's head and took over the army," shouted despairing General Mikołaj Bołtuć, commander of the Operational Group "East" after the battle, to General Thommée.
"I have no contacts with Kutrzeb"
“We handed over the Bzura and we were jammed with it,” recalled Kutewka. The commander ordered to wade through the Kampinos Forest to Warsaw and Modlin. The intricate battle plan collapsed due to one man's nervous breakdown. After that, the "Pomerania" Army did nothing to save itself from extermination. There was also no cooperation between the "Warszawa" Army, whose command after the defection from the "Łódź" Army was taken over by Rómmel.
On September 11, Kutuwie asked him to hit the rear of the retreating Germans. Rómmel promised to support the armies of "Poznań" and "Pomerania" by all means available. At the same time, he lied in his report to Śmigły:“I have no contact with Kutrzeb. They were cut by armored elements of the enemy. ”
General Rómmel forbade units defending Warsaw to support those fighting on the Bzura River.
On September 16, Colonel Marian Porwit, commander of the western section of the capital's defense, lost his patience and prepared an attack with the forces of seven infantry battalions, supported by tanks and tankettes. The plan was supported by General Czuma. When everything was ready, Rómmel ordered the attack to be called off. He did nothing to support the fighters on the Bzura river, although two German armies could be gripped and the fate of the battle could be decided. The Polish Army officers considered it a betrayal.
Over 150,000 Polish soldiers fought in the Battle of Bzura. 100,000 went into captivity. Over a dozen thousand Polish graves remain on the river bank in 72 cemeteries. Three generals were killed:Mikołaj Bołtuć, Franciszek Wład and Stanisław Skotnicki-Grzmot.
The offensive of the Poles brought them recognition even from their enemies. On September 20, General Johannes Blaskowitz wrote in his order of the day about "one of the greatest, most devastating battles of all time." After the war, it was compared with the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes of December 1944. Marshal Erich von Manstein also pointed out that during the French campaign there was no offensive action, reminiscent of, for example, Kutrzeb's maneuver.