But the superiority of the Wehrmacht was not only quantitative:it was ready for aggression. His troops were concentrated in compact groupings that had everything necessary for operations. The soldiers and officers had combat experience, they had been to the school of fire in the west and in the south-east of Europe.
As for the Red Army forces, they were not ready to be engaged and had not completed their strategic deployment. They were scattered over an immense front 4,500 kilometers in length and over a depth of 400 kilometers. Many regiments and divisions were understrength; the German infantry division had 16,800 men, the Soviet division 14,400 men. But, in fact, the strength of most of our divisions did not exceed 8,000 men. Following the directives of the government, the high command of the Soviet army had not authorized the prior deployment of troops and the occupation by them of combat positions.
Moreover, the construction of defensive works along the border was far from complete. The air force had received orders not to shoot down German planes that violated the airspace of the U.S.S.R. but to simply force them to land. However, six months before the war, 152 cases of violation of Russian airspace by German planes carrying out reconnaissance had been recorded.