On June 10, 1940 the Italian dictator Mussolin had declared war on dying France and isolated Britain. Mussolini had feared at the time that the war would end without his country benefiting from it. Immediately after the declaration of war, Italian troops attacked France, on the front of the Maritime Alps, but were shamefully repulsed.
The capitulation of France, however, also led Mussolini to the ranks of the winners. Confined to the veils of his vanity, Mussolini, after the "triumph" in France, decided to test the fate of his weapons in North Africa. His target this time was British-occupied Egypt.
The "empire" is being prepared
Mussolini had every reason to be optimistic, since he had about 450,000 men on the African continent. Of these, more than 200,000 were developed in Cyrenaica - the ancient Greek Cyrene - a stone's throw from Egypt. The rest were developed in East Africa, threatening the British colonies and possessions there.
In early August 1940 the Italian Commander-in-Chief in North Africa Marshal Rodolfo Graziani had two armies at his disposal. In Tripoli was stationed his 5th Army under General Italo Gariboldi, comprising the 10th, 20th and 23rd Army Corps (SS) with six army divisions, two blackcoat divisions and a Libyan division. In Cyrenaica was stationed the 10th Italian Army, under General Berti, comprising the 21st and 22nd SS with three army divisions, a blackcoat division and a Libyan division.
However, these 14 divisions should not create false impressions. The Italian forces were poorly supplied and woefully outfitted and staffed. Each infantry division had only 8 of the medium 47mm anti-tank guns. In terms of armored Italian forces only light chariots and tanks. In total Marshal Graziani had 152,775 men, 410 tanks, 1,441 guns and 8,000 general purpose vehicles.
The "empire" is shaking...
On 15 July 1940 Mussolini ordered Graziani to attack. His target was Egypt and the Suez Canal. But Graziani only decided to move on September 9. His tardiness was due to the fact that he first had to gather his forces scattered at the four points of the horizon, with the minimal means of transport at his disposal.
After toil and suffering, the Italians moved and on September 16 advanced to Sidi Barani, inside Egyptian territory. But there the Italians stopped, waiting for the construction of an aqueduct that would supply the army with water – the already existing water reservoirs that existed in Bardia had been destroyed by French naval bombardment.
In Sidi Barani the Italians were immobilized for almost three months. It wasn't until December 3, 1940 that the aqueduct was ready. Following this, Graziani decided to launch his attack on Egypt on December 15. But the British caught up with him. Being particularly concerned about the fate of Egypt, Churchill had decided, and despite the threat against the British Isles themselves, to reinforce the weak British forces guarding Egypt.
The real Empire strikes back
The military command of Egypt, under Sir Henry Mydland Wilson, was formed, with the 13th Army Corps - this name was given in mid-December, after the start of operations. The 13th Corps, under General O'Connor, had the famous 7th Armored Division (the "Desert Rats"), the 4th Indian Infantry Division, two more infantry brigades.
One brigade formed the garrison of Marsa Matrouh, the next objective of the Italian attack. Shortly afterwards these forces were reinforced with the 6th Australian Division. In total the British had about 30,000 fighting men. However, their divisions were entirely motorized and therefore agile.
Also the British overwhelmingly surpassed their opponents in the quality of tanks and aircraft they fielded. Especially the A-12 tanks, the famous "Matilda", rightly received the nickname "queen of battle". Although slow-moving, these tanks had very strong armor, which made them almost invulnerable to Italian anti-tank fire. Weighing his strengths and weaknesses, Wilson decided to conduct "offensive reconnaissance" against the Italian positions around Sidi Barani.
A big broom sweeps the Italians
In this position the Italians had established themselves defensively in a series of strong points, which, however, were so badly established that they could not support each other. The four Italian divisions of the 10th Army were stationed at a distance of 30 km from each other, on average. The connecting link of this problematic arrangement was the Maleti Motor Complex, which was stationed in Nibevia. The British, rightly, decided that their first target should be exactly the Maleti Complex.
If this group was destroyed, the other Italian divisions would also be destroyed one by one, isolated and unable to move as they were. The British "Matildas" moved throughout the evening of 8-9 December in a south-westerly direction and on the morning of 9 December they appeared south of the Maleti Motor Group. The noise of their approach was covered by the aerial bombardment of enemy positions by the RAF. Under these conditions, the Italian motor group was swept away.
Its commander himself, General Maleti, was killed fighting. In less than four hours it was all over. At the same time, the commander of the 2nd Libyan Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Pescatori, hearing the "sound of the cannons", formed a phalanx which he sent to reinforce Maleti. This phalanx was pulverized on the way by the formidable British Matildas and by evening the 2nd Libyan Division had the same fate, which was cut to pieces by the 4th Indian Division in cooperation with a division of 22 Matildas.
On the same day the 1st Libyan Division was surprised by Marsa Matrouh's guard brigade and fled towards Sidi Barani, rushing in turn to be trapped. Indeed Sindhi Barani was attacked by the 4th Indian Division and the Matildas on 11 December. The 3rd January Blackcoat Division, which made up the garrison, was literally disbanded.
Having already lost four of his divisions, Graziani ordered his remaining forces on the Egyptian border to retreat. However, the transfer of the order was faulty. The result of this was the anchoring of the "Cirene" and "Katanzaro" divisions and causing them heavy losses.
The "fortress" Bardia
Finally, what remained of the advanced Italian forces found refuge, under General Bergancioli, in the "fortified location" of Bardia, inside what is now Libyan territory. At Bardia four Italian divisions with about 45,000 men, supported by 430 guns. The "fortified site" of Bardia had an extension of 38 km
The fortification was surrounded by several small concrete "patrolls" each of which had two machine guns and a 47 mm anti-tank gun. Beyond the outer perimeter there was nothing else. All the field artillery was positioned completely uncovered. It was rather ridiculous to expect serious resistance from the besieged in Bardia.
The Italian command, however, had no choice but to order a defense, without the idea of a retreat, in this particular position, since its infantry forces could not attempt to escape from the pursuit of the motorized and armored British forces. The British actually attacked Bardia on December 17.
To their credit, the Italians prolonged their agony until January 5th. On this day the remnants of Bergancioli's forces surrendered. Already at the time of the start of their attack, the British had captured 75,000 Italian prisoners, having destroyed 8 enemy divisions. They were not satisfied with their victory. They immediately attacked Tobruk, which they also besieged from January 7, 1941 to January 25.
Hunting to Libya
The 6th Australian Division on this day accepted the surrender of the 25,000 Italians garrisoning the city, bringing the number of prisoners captured to 100,000 men. But again the British did not stop. Instead of moving via the coastal road, where the Italians had organized their defenses, the British again moved south-west through the desert and captured the road junction of Mekili, within the Italian province of Cyrenaica, to the south of the Italian forces. .
On February 9, 1941, British forces arrived at El Aguila, in the Gulf of Sirte. All the more easterly blockaded Italian forces were also forced to surrender. Within two months the British had fought 900 km and at a cost of 550 dead and 1,973 wounded had captured 130,000 Italian prisoners and captured or destroyed nearly 400 enemy tanks and 845 guns.
It was an unprecedented disaster for which Mussolini was primarily responsible and Graziani secondarily. "The hard experience of these very bitter days leads us to the conclusion that, in the specific theater of operations, a single armored division is stronger than an entire army." The above entry was found in the diary of the ridiculous Italian dictator Mussolini.