The Volhynia slaughter is one of the darkest pages in the history of Polish-Ukrainian relations. The murders of Poles in the years 1943–1945 took from 80 to even 130 thousand lives. There could have been much fewer victims, but those killed ... no one helped. Where was the Home Army when the UPA slaughtered our countrymen?
With the help of weapons, primitive agricultural tools - axes, forks and flails - and with their bare hands, between 1943 and 1945, Ukrainian nationalists murdered tens of thousands of Poles. How did it happen that the well-organized and functioning Polish Underground State allowed it? Why did the Home Army react so late to the extermination of the Polish inhabitants of Volhynia?
Call for help ignored
Errors and late reactions of the Home Army Headquarters to the situation in Volhynia resulted to a large extent from the disrespectful attitude to the reports provided from this area. It was not that KG did not know about the tense situation and the growing Ukrainian nationalists against Poles.
However, all activities of the underground were primarily aimed at supporting a general uprising against Germany. Unfortunately, Polish leaders in this regard showed a disastrous lack of orientation in reality. As Dariusz Faszcza points out:
Information about the growing threat to the Polish population in Volhynia was initially treated with disbelief in Warsaw. This was due to a false opinion in the leading centers of the Polish Underground State about the low socialization of the inhabitants of Volhynia, their favorable attitude towards Poles in connection with the greater achievements of Polish governments in this area, and above all, the disregard for the national aspirations of Ukrainians and the influence that the OUN had among them.
Partisan oath of the soldiers of the 27th Volhynian Infantry Division of the Home Army, winter 1944. Where were these soldiers when the Poles living in Volhynia needed them the most?
The commanders of the Home Army also lost the conviction that all activities that could threaten them from the Ukrainians would be concentrated in the territories of Eastern Galicia and - after the defeat of the German occupant - in Lviv, as was the case in 1918 after the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In the eyes of the AK decision-makers, Volhynia was a loyal land that did not pose a problem as mentioned by General Grot-Rowecki at the end of May 1942.
The soap bubble of optimism, which was to prove the good situation of these areas, was also co-created by the official Information Bulletin. It discussed the pro-Polish attitudes of the Ukrainian inhabitants of Volhynia, both in 1942 and March 1943, when the murders of Poles had already become a fact. As Piotr Zychowicz mentions in the book "Wołyń betrayed, or how the command of the Home Army abandoned the Poles to the UPA":
Warsaw was blissfully convinced that Poles from Volhynia from Volhynia were not in any serious danger because:
1. Volhynia is inhabited by submissive, kind and poorly nationally aware Ruthenian peasants.
2. The Ukrainian masses of Volhynia have a positive attitude towards Poland, because they remember the period of gentle rule of voivode Henryk Józewski.
3. The organization of Ukrainian Nationalists is weak in Volhynia and does not enjoy the same support as in Eastern Galicia.
4. The Polish-Ukrainian conflict in Volhynia can be solved through negotiations.
Unfortunately, what the leaders wanted to see in the capital did not match what those who were there saw and reported. And although disturbing reports reached the headquarters, no one took them seriously in 1942.
In Warsaw, people were convinced that the reports were exaggerated. Besides, the overriding goal was to defeat the Germans. With this conviction, the Volhynia District of the Home Army was finally established, headed by Colonel Kazimierz Bąbiński, who initially commanded it from the Lviv district.
Problems of the Volhynian underground
Compared to other areas that used to be part of the Second Polish Republic, the construction of the Home Army began late in Volhynia. It was not without significance that - contrary to what was believed in the capital - the Volyn land was not favorable to Poles since the outbreak of World War II. As Dariusz Fraszka rightly signals:
this state was influenced by (...) the planned and consistently implemented policy of deportation of the Polish population, arrest and conscription of two years to the Red Army . This led to a significant reduction in the Polish population in Volyn. It should also be remembered that these actions were aimed at the most educated and politically conscious social groups, and this in turn had a serious impact on the underground and military possibilities in this area.
Meanwhile, from the perspective of the command of the Polish Underground State in Warsaw, Wołyń seemed to be a distant province. Of course, he was assigned a role in the prepared plan of the general uprising, but it was to consist mainly in the local AK units cutting off German supplies from the eastern front.
Kazimierz Bąbiński did not know the area under his control, which also contributed to the delay in the rescue operation. In the picture. officers of the KOP Battalion Trakai:Lt. Col. K. Bąbiński and Lt. S. Zalfresso-Jundziło, Troki 1934.
It was one of the main reasons why the famous 27th Volhynian Infantry Division of the Home Army was established in 1944 - at a time when the slaughter was slowly becoming history. For this reason, her actions were primarily of a retaliatory nature. As one of the members of the 27th Infantry Division recalled:"the unit dealt mainly with the fight against the Germans, but with the Ukrainians there were also skirmishes . I remember that in our area there was the Ukrainian village of Gnojno. Our people went to this village, burned down a few houses and killed civilians in retaliation. ”
Even long after the culmination of the Banderites' murders, acts of revenge were carried out. However, they occurred to a large extent post factum - they were in response to a former cry for help that came too late for the callers.
Moreover, Colonel Bąbiński, pseudonym Luboń, who headed the Volhynian underground, did not know the area under his control. It was a new and foreign area for him. Equipped with guidelines from the capital, it was not until March 1943 that he managed to get to Kowel, where he saw with his own eyes one of the parades of surviving Poles, about whom Piotr Zychowicz writes:
Ghosts have started pouring in to the cities. First individually, then in groups, in groups, and finally in whole columns. These specters turned out to be human. Barely shuffling legs, staggering with exhaustion. Burned clothes hung in tatters and his eyes widened in dumb terror that they had gone through hell.
It was undoubtedly a moment of awakening for Bąbiński, when “(...) he realized that the Home Army Headquarters had completely failed to prepare him for the challenges he had to face now. And the instructions he received at the briefing in Warsaw do not correspond to the reality of Volhynia at all. ”
Self-defense centers in the Volyn voivodeship in 1943.
Condemned to self-defense
When Luboń finally saw his eyes, he began to send reports to the capital about the alarming situation he found there. Warsaw received news of mass slaughter, the victims of which were counted in the hundreds as early as April 1943. "The murders took place in a terrible way," alarmed Bąbiński. - "Burning alive, chopping, twisting joints."
At the same time, he reported on self-defense units organized by local people of Polish origin; he even boasted that they were made at his command. It's just that Poles actually came up with this idea much earlier, assuming that waiting for outside help can only lead them to the grave faster . Methodical actions to stop the massacre of the Home Army did not take place until the apogee of the murders had passed. As reported by Grzegorz Motyka:
The massacres of July 11, 1943 prompted Kazimierz Banach and Colonel Kazimierz Bąbiński to cooperate. On July 19, they jointly issued an order to merge the State Security Corps and civil administration with the army. The next day, the command of the Home Army decided to immediately create partisan units, which were to be ready on July 28.
However, it was too late for tens of thousands of murdered Poles. The help came too late and turned out to be insufficient. Moreover, contrary to what Colonel Kazimierz Bąbiński wrote, the structures subordinate to him carried out almost no liquidation actions of the Bandera ringleaders. In the spring of 1943, the criminals could feel completely safe in Volhynia. Several sentences "on behalf of the Republic" - in Łuck and Włodzimierz Wołyński - were carried out only in the second half of 1943.
However, it was not only the tardiness on the part of the command that delayed the actions of the underground army in Volhynia. As Piotr Zychowicz emphasizes in the book "Wołyń betrayed":
Disregard for the UPA force, clinging to absurd insurgent plans and the indifference of the General Headquarters were not the only reasons for the surprising passivity of the Home Army. Another extremely shocking reason was that the leaders of the Polish underground in Volhynia ... quarreled (…).
The parties to the conflict were, on the one hand, the Volyn Commander of the Home Army, Colonel Kazimierz Bąbiński "Luboń", and on the other - the Volyn government delegate to Poland, Kazimierz Banach, using the pseudonym "Jan Linowski ”.
The former - a Piłsudski, former soldier of the Legions and peowiak, clearly did not like the latter - an activist of a socially radical and dissect during the times of the Reformation of the People's Party. And with reciprocity. The gentlemen, instead of acting together for the benefit of the local population, competed for power. There were tavern quarrels between them , for example, which structures should deal with fighting the UPA (Bąbiński was in favor of handing it over to the Underground Police, while Banach wanted to arm the population).
Meanwhile, when they were arguing about who should lead the action to save Poles, the action itself stood still.
Why has the relief not come?
Of course, not all actions of the Home Army at that time should be assessed negatively. Despite the confusion and disorganization prevailing at the tops of the Polish Underground State structures, the history of Volhynia also includes examples of the heroic struggle of local leaders and activists.
Corpses of murdered Poles during the UPA raid on the colony of Lipniki on March 26, 1943. If the Home Army had reacted faster, there could have been much fewer casualties.
It is worth mentioning here, for example, Henryk Cybulski "Harry" and Ludwik Malinowski "Lion", whose wide-ranging and heroic defensive actions were a salt in the eye of the Bandera followers. Their sacrifice not only saved many Polish lives, but also led to a significant weakening of the forces of Ukrainian nationalists in 1944.
Unfortunately, it is impossible not to ask the question:what if… If the reaction came faster? What if reports weren't ignored? What if the support had been sent sooner? Finally, if the meals were more numerous? As Piotr Zychowicz lists in "Betrayed Volhynia":
In the summer of 1943, when the genocidal murders of the Poles in Volhynia reached their peak, the local structures of the Home Army could not provide any serious help to their countrymen. This was due to five main reasons:
1. The structures of the Polish underground in Volhynia were established too late.
2. The Wołyńska AK, consistently disregarding the threat posed by the UPA, did not form partisan units that could defend the Poles living there.
3. The Home Army clung to the anti-German insurgent plans and focused most of its efforts on preparing for the Operation "Tempest".
4. The effective operation of the Volhynian underground was paralyzed by the sharp conflict between the Home Army commander and the government delegate to the country.
5. The Volyn AK - despite many appeals and requests - did not receive any supplies of weapons and people from central Poland.
The most disturbing fact, however, is that the actual list of reasons was even longer.
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