We have already discussed in this blog the topic of the disappearance of the Spanish overseas empire (See:https://miradahistorica.net/2016/12/01/los-ultimos-de-filipinas/ ), so now our interest is focused on the consequences of those events in Spanish society. The colonial loss shocked the country, was described as a national disaster, and this pessimistic view has remained valid until recently. However, the most contemporary historiography has nuanced that vision by providing other interpretations that are not so tremendous.
Colonial problems, especially in Cuba, had dragged on since the beginning of the Democratic Administration (1868-1874), but it was in the final decade of the 19th century when the Cuban and Philippine emancipation movements gained great strength in an international context conducive to it:the Growing imperialist competition and US expansionism added to the errors of Spanish colonial policy.
The political context
The Ten Years' War (1868-1878), between Spain and Cuban independence forces, had already shown that the Spanish domination of Cuba could not continue unabated. Since 1893, the colonial policy of the Spanish governments showed their inability to face the problems derived from the model of domination. The reformist and decentralizing attempts in Cuba and the Philippines came too late and were not even approved by the Cortes.
Puerto Rico did not pose serious problems because autonomy had been approved in 1872, slavery had been abolished (1873), and the economy was showing some growth. In addition, Spanish domination was more effective since it was exercised through a powerful economic elite that controlled popular-based emancipatory movements.
By contrast, in Cuba, the reforms were more complicated. Slavery was later abolished, in 1886, with the opposition of some economic groups. The administrative reforms proposed by Antonio Maura were rejected in the Cortes as "unpatriotic", causing the crisis of the Liberal government and his resignation. The "Spanish" sectors of the island managed to stop the intentions of granting it a certain degree of autonomy. This intransigence favored the growth of the independence movement, backed by the Cuban Revolutionary Party, created by José Martí in 1892.
In this way, the Cuban political actors were divided into three well-defined currents:
- The Spanish supporters of a colonial-type union with the peninsula.
- The autonomists, who defended the Spanishness of the island but also recognized its own identity. They requested an administration linked to the Spanish government but with some concessions such as the right of self-determination. Its main representative was the Liberal Autonomist Party led by Rafael Montoro and Rafael María de Labra.
- The independence fighters, represented by the Cuban Revolutionary Party of José Martí
The case of the Philippine Islands was different due to the scarce Spanish presence and its geographical distance. However, as in Cuba, the absence of reforms was generating an emancipatory movement created by mestizos:the Philippine League (1893), led by José Rizal, which became radicalized thanks to the erroneous actions of the governor. The reforms proposed by Maura also came late.
The conflict that ended up meaning the loss of the last Spanish overseas colonies had two well-defined phases. The first began in 1895, with a nationalist insurrection in Cuba that caused the last war between the Spanish army and Cuban insurgents and lasted until 1898. The second phase occurred in 1898 when the United States intervened in the conflict; then the Spanish-American war was unleashed.
The causes of the conflict with the United States
The reasons of the United States to intervene in the colony were of various kinds:
- The existence of a long political tradition – the so-called Monroe Doctrine – that claimed the influence of the United States throughout the Caribbean and America, of which it had already given signs with the attempts to buy Cuba from Spain. This interest is situated in the context of North American imperialist expansion throughout America and Asia –let's not lose sight of the Philippines.
- The aid of the United States to the Cuban insurgents had been constant since 1896. The reforms introduced by the Sagasta government in 1897 were not enough for the American president, the Republican McKinley, in favor of purchase or annexation. In short, the intentions of the United States were clear.
- In February 1898 the explosion of the American battleship Maine , moored in the port of Havana, produced 266 victims. This was the pretext for the declaration of war on Spain on April 25, 189
As Javier Tusell affirms of the numerous international conflicts that took place throughout the world at the end of the 19th century, the one that pitted Empaña against the United States was the only one that ended in war, since in the rest the strongest contender always withdrew. weak.
Today there is no doubt that the explosion of the Maine it was accidental, but the Americans managed to impose the conclusions of their investigation that attributed it to an external mine, an act of sabotage in short; the Spanish commission attributed it to an accident. His account of the events convinced American public opinion of the need to respond and favored the interventionist strategy of the government of President McKinley. As we have already said, on April 25 the United States declared war on Spain.
The Battleship Maine Incident it was only the «casus belli», the causes of the war were others. The Cuban sugar companies had created solid commercial relations with the United States, linking the island with the North American economy. Commercial ties that would have been more intense if it had not been for the protectionist economic policy imposed by the Spanish government and that harmed the interests of the island. In addition, the Cuban revolutionaries also received US material support, especially after General Weyler's harsh policy on the island. Similarly, the political and diplomatic role of Spain was weakened by rejecting the offer of US mediation and showing an image of intransigence that harmed it internationally.
In the months before the war, an anti-Spanish journalistic campaign was developed in the United States that already responded to what was going to be mass journalism, of a sensationalist type, typical of the 20th century and in which figures such as J. Pulitzer or W. R. Hearst. Campaign that continued until the end of the war.
The Spanish governments became aware of the seriousness of the problem, but were unable to find an alternative solution to the war. In February 1898, the United States offered Spain 300 million dollars – a significant amount – to cede the island to it, but neither party accepted the offer. The political and popular opposition to the abandonment of Cuba was very strong. The Spanish political elites preferred a military defeat, which they had assumed, rather than a political cession that could bring down the monarchy and the Restoration regime itself. Nor did any of the great European powers want to support the Spanish position and confront the new emerging imperialist power.
In the peninsula, the opposition to the war was a minority because only republicans and socialists criticized it. The signs of patriotism spread throughout Spain, supported by the press –as in the United States– and in the pulpits.
The war
Contrary to expectations, the war began in the Pacific when American ships attacked the Spanish in Cavite Bay. The confrontation ended with the dismantling of the Spanish Pacific fleet. This fact showed that President McKinley wanted to have a strategy to strategically control the Pacific Ocean, where he already owned Midway, Wake and Guam. In the Antilles, the confrontation was also essentially naval, a weapon in which North American superiority was unquestionable. The result of this difference was the serious defeat of Santiago de Cuba, which left the island without naval defense. The differences between both fleets were enormous. The total tonnage of Spanish ships represented half of that of North American ships and, furthermore, our ships were older and had less armor.
The war ended with the Treaty of Paris (December 10, 1898) by which Spain recognized the independence of Cuba and ceded Puerto Rico, the Philippines and the island of Guam to the United States, in exchange for compensation of 20 million dollars. . At the end of February of the following year, Spain granted the Caroline Islands, the Marianas (less Guam) and Palau to Germany, in exchange for 25 million dollars. With this, the Spanish overseas empire was liquidated, passing into the hands of the great imperialist powers of the moment.
Despite the defeat, the military effort made by Spain was very considerable and fell, especially, on the popular classes who were the ones who provided the necessary military contingents. Some 250,000 soldiers were mobilized and some 60,000 casualties were suffered, mostly from malaria and yellow fever.
The consequences of the Disaster.
The defeat reconfigured the Spanish position in international relations. The abandonment of concerns in America and the Pacific concentrated Spanish interests in its European environment, aligning itself with France and Great Britain in the imperialist policy in North Africa and the western Mediterranean. Spain became aware of its new role as a secondary power and focused on its closest geopolitical interests, driven by the dominant imperialism at that juncture. She then sought to secure and expand her colonial holdings in Africa:
- Territories located in the Moroccan north, in the Rif region, which in 1913 would give rise to the Spanish Protectorate of Morocco.
- Ifni region, recognized by Morocco as Spanish since 1860, although without effective occupation until 1934.
- Spanish Sahara, territory created from the area of Rio de Oro (1885) to which other areas were added until the known map was configured.
- Spanish Guinea, whose colonization had begun in 1885 from the Berlin Conference.
Regenerationism.
The warlike enthusiasm was soon transformed into a generalized pessimism provoked by the awareness of the imperial weakness of Spain. However, the fundamental objective, which was the maintenance of the monarchical regime in order to ward off possible revolutionary dangers such as those produced in the Sexenio or in the Paris Commune, not so distant in time, was fully achieved. From this perspective, the regime was effective in assuming the consequences of defeat and, especially, the possible disastrous consequences – economic and political – of a prolonged war.
The only political novelty that the defeat brought was the reflection on the national question. On the one hand, the need to deepen a renewed process of nationalization of the Spanish, supported by intellectuals and politicians, became evident. But, on the other hand, peripheral regionalisms emerged in parallel.
With the aim of renewing the nation and its political regime, an intellectual movement arose –Ricardo Macías Picabea, Luis Morote, Rafael Altamira, Joaquín Costa,…– and later a political one, whose objective was the improvement and modernization of the nation through diverse proposals. : These proposals were called regenerationism. It was an examination of conscience carried out by intellectuals and politicians at the turn of the century, and whose axes were:the dignity of politics, social modernization and overcoming cultural and scientific backwardness. Its most active supporters were the politicians Antonio Maura, Francisco Silvela and José Canalejas.
In March 1899 a government was formed headed by Francisco Silvela and General Polavieja as Minister of War. Both intended to regenerate the country but without modifying the political system of the Restoration – that is, without reforming the Crown, the parties or the army. Even so, some reforms were approved in the Treasury, the Army and the territorial organization. But the regenerationist government ended up dissolving in December 1900, showing the inability of the system to evolve. And, although other subsequent governments tried to implement some measures, these were not enough to prevent a slow erosion of the regime that would end up imploding first in the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-1930) and then, and definitively, in the Second Republic (1931). )
The economic benefits of the Disaster.
On the economic plane, the disaster was not such. Only textile production, essentially located in Catalonia, suffered from the loss of colonial markets. But the defeat prompted the repatriation of numerous Spanish capitals that revitalized some regions and economic sectors. It is estimated that some two billion pesetas were repatriated – the same amount that the war had cost; With this money, banks such as the Banco Hispano Americano, the Banco de Vizcaya and the Banco Español de Crédito were founded, they invested in mines and metallurgical industries, mainly in the Cantabrian strip, chemical and electrical sectors. In short, this injection of money made it possible to sustain constant economic growth that can be linked to the second industrial revolution and that was favored by the application of protectionist policies that benefited the main productive sectors.
Bibliography.
Canales, C., &Del Rey, M. (2010). Brief history of the 1998 war . Madrid:Nowtilus.
Diaz-Plaja, F. (1971). The History of Spain in its documents. From Felipe II to the disaster of 1898 . Barcelona:G.P. Editions
Pereira, J.C. (1999). Reinterpretations of 1998. Spanish defeat or modernizing drive? Foreign Policy, 67 .
Perez Vejo, T. (2020). June 3, 1898. The end of the Spanish empire . Barcelona:Taurus.
Tuñón de Lara, M., Andrés-Gallego, J., &Abellán, J. L. (1985). The disaster of '98. History Notebooks 16, 30 .
Tusell, J. (2012). Spain in the 20th century. 1. From 98 to the proclamation of the Republic (Vol.1). Barcelona:Editorial Taurus.
Villares, R., &Moreno Luzon, J. (2009). Restoration and dictatorship (vol 7). Barcelona:Critique / Marcial Pons.