On November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall fell. At that moment, the power of the East German Communist Party (SED) led by Egon Krenz came to a 'visible' end. But before that happened, the population had to take massive action against the party and the government. It did this by holding ever-larger demonstrations in the cities and by forming citizen movements.
The leaders' 'empty' idealistic promises for a socialist utopia collided with the harsh reality. The reforms demanded by the population were influenced by Gorbachev's perestroika, foreign smear campaigns against the GDR, poor social and economic facilities. These demands were not met by the leaders but met with arrests, repression and expulsion. Many citizens did not wait any longer and left, party members resigned and the party began to lose its power over the state and society.
The party leadership had to reform to regain power. Was Krenz reform-minded enough to get 'die Wende' as he himself called it, and did the existing power structures also allow it?
The last months of the DDR regime
In the final stages of his party's rule, can party leader Egon Krenz be seen as a reformer? A reformer who, by meeting the reform demands of the people, could have saved the power of the party and the party itself?
Various embassies in East Berlin kept a close eye on developments at the top of the SED. At the end of August, the Dutch embassy had already considered the question of the succession of party leader Honecker, with the greatest opportunities being attributed to Krenz. That Krenz could be a credible alternative to Honecker, however, was doubted by many.
The NRC wrote on 9 October 1989 that the world view of the new leader "does not differ substantially from that of his mentor Honecker and that the GDR view is characterized above all by uncertainty about its own legitimacy, uncertainty about the consequences of reforms in a country. which is not yet a nation but a state, built on ideological foundations.”
A few days later, however, the Dutch ambassador Jacobs noted a change in the view of Krenz. Commenting on the large demonstration in Leipzig on October 9, 1989, Jacobs wrote that “the credit” for the non-intervention by the security forces on that day went to Krenz. He was in charge of security matters within the SED. He was therefore also responsible for the peaceful course of that day. This surprised the ambassador in view of Krenz's reputation, but it did match some remarkable 'critical' articles in the Junge Welt newspaper, which could be regarded as the mouthpiece of the former chairman of the youth association (Krenz). “Is Krenz separating from Honecker (and from his own reputation) at the eleventh hour?” Jacobs wondered. (…)
The East German reactions to Krenz's announcement of a 'Wende' of party politics were, according to Jacobs, rather "skeptical and shrug." It was encouraging that Krenz devoted long passages to the economy, as this indicated that he was aware of the seriousness of the economic problems. It was disappointing, however, that Krenz proved unwilling to accept the new opposition movements as a partner in all dialogue policies. (…)
In the weeks after taking office, Krenz hastily sought to gain popular trust by developing a new political style. For example, he tried to accommodate the population in terms of employee participation and to offer them freedom of travel. The massive departure of DDR citizens was one of the biggest problems for Krenz.
Credibility as a reformer
However, his credibility as a reformer was highly questionable. First, many East Germans found it disappointing that a few days after taking office as party leader, he had also been elected chairman of the GDR's State Council and National Defense Council. After all, this kept all power concentrated in one person, just like with his predecessor Honecker. It also immediately became clear that he was holding on to the party's central position of power.
Krenz was also haunted by his past as second man behind Honecker and as chairman of the electoral commission that had been responsible for the election fraud of May 1989. At the beginning of October he had even praised the suppression of the student protests in Beijing in June 1989.
The Dutch embassy and the Dutch press pointed out sharply that the people regarded Krenz's promises as 'too little, too late', due to the ambiguity of his 'Wende' policy. For example, the embassy wrote that Krenz's speech on October 24, 1989 must have been a disappointment. In particular, his announcement on the freedom of travel and the electoral procedures were not sufficient in the eyes of the protest movements:"The demands of the protest movement have long gone beyond that:total freedom of travel, free and secret elections, freedom of association and assembly, abolition of censorship, separation of party and state. The people now also wanted the abolition of the party's monopoly on power.” (…)
The question was why the leadership came up with such inadequate proposals. The NRC seemed to seek an explanation in the divergence between the vision of the leaders and the wishes of the citizens. This problem arose from the fact that reforms in the GDR had started essentially too late. According to Trouw, this led to the harrowing scene that Krenz continued to cherish the “peasant and workers state” “while the peasants and workers (leave)”
Moreover, Krenz maintained his ideological view that changes could only take place while preserving socialism and even in the service of improving socialism. Krenz was and remained a hard communist. In an interview with Welt in 2007, Krenz reiterated his socialist convictions, referring to the political system of the Federal Republic:“Das politische system, das jetzt existiert, ist nicht mein System” (“The political system, as it exists today, is not my system").
Did the GDR's political system allow for reforms?
Retrospective research shows that, if Krenz actually introduced reforms, this would be at the expense of the party's dominant position. He had no chance in advance to save the socialist GDR and the leading role of the SED in it.
First, Krenz's policy of dialogue with opposition movements marked the end of the SED's leading role in the GDR. Second, the constitutionally enshrined leadership role of the SED had been lifted by the “parliament.” Third, the SED was entangled in its own political system, through the entanglement of party and state organs; the party occupied all the key positions in state organs, which had to be given up in a dialogue with other parties. And finally, the question of legitimacy that arises with the introduction of a democratic system with a multi-party system became the subject of debate, and with it the 'legitimacy' of the SED's right to exist.
In short:On the one hand, she feared that the GDR would become capitalist by satisfying the population with far-reaching reforms. This would undermine the raison d'être of a separate East German state alongside the Federal Republic. On the other hand, in the absence of reforms, the exodus of the GDR would probably continue, affecting the dominant position of the SED and the East German state equally. Untangling the intertwining state-party ideology meant that, due to the domino effect, one pillar after another would fall. In any case, the unification of both Germanys was irreversible.
See further
- Fall of the Wall