It is said that the Alawite king Hassan II owned a map that incorporated his dream of the «Greater Morocco» the former Spanish Sahara, the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla, the Canary Islands and even Andalusia, also reaching Mauritania. True or false, the facts of his persistent step-by-step policy, winning or buying from neighbors before buying the house, with his "throw the stone and hide my hand" strategy, pointing to others as the culprits and Morocco as the victim , over time it was bearing fruit in filling some of the gaps that were missing in the aforementioned map, or at least, according to his understanding, it opened the way to achieve it. Map that seems to have been bequeathed to his son, the current monarch Mohamed VI.
Now we are attentive to the diplomatic, migratory and, therefore, humanitarian crisis that is currently hanging over Ceuta with the irregular entry in a single day of some 10,000 Moroccans (mostly young) along with some Sub-Saharans, with the passive complicity of the Moroccan security forces. Extensive crisis in the health field due to the difficulties of Covid control of newcomers. And all of us, despite some failure in the necessary political unity, seek an immediate and rapid solution to the problem that this migratory challenge represents, very serious for Ceuta, without this really being the true substance of the matter, while some allude to to some root causes of the situation, causes that in some way apparently blame us.
However, even if we now resolve the situation positively by responding correctly to the pulse posed by Morocco, we will not have done more than apparently close a chronic neighborhood problem in the time that always opens when we play fully, opposing ourselves in some way to Moroccan expansionism; Thus, every time we raise our historical and legal sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla, the Canary Islands and their waters, and let us say nothing when we point to an exit via referendum to the Sahara, Morocco, feeling ignored, offers us a threatening response to show its discrepancy. That is when tensions arise in the form, according to analysts not dependent on neighborhood diplomacy, Moroccan blackmail, pressure or repressive measures, threats...
Regardless of generalities and debatable digressions, to understand the current situation we have to go into the specifics to analyze the situation as correctly as possible based on known data: the armed conflict between Morocco and the Polisario Front for the sovereignty of the territory of Western Sahara, the effects derived from it and the foreign diplomatic positions before such sovereignty.
The issue of Western Sahara
In this meeting of hostile wills, the Sahrawis, considering their national sovereignty an inalienable issue and the Moroccans, taking the Sahara as a "national cause" (their own territory), are confronted, for a side, the current declaration of Saharawi war (taken by Morocco as a unilateral breach of the ceasefire established since 1975) and the continuity of its armed activity seeking that this, growing in intensity, force Morocco to an effective armed response, and on the other hand, the Moroccan silence (which is causing damage to Saharawi morale), along with intense diplomatic activity in their favor (tense for the Saharawis) from the base of their relations with the US and France (their main supporters and suppliers of weapons).
A war without, for the moment, effective Moroccan military intervention against the Saharawi forces, which has counted as a precedent, and also counts today, with a diplomatic struggle, developed in continuity until the current moment by both parties, a war that seeks, in both cases, the recognition of their respective positions by those countries and organizations of all kinds that are related to them or have doubts about the proposals of the parties.
Thus, in thirty years Morocco has managed to make its thesis, refusal to self-determination, cease to be debated in the international arena , thanks to its alliances:a privileged partner of Spain, with France (a country that has not finished reconciling with Algeria due to the war and the colonial period), the USA, the United Kingdom, the monarchies of the Persian Gulf countries, dozens of countries Africans (forty-one of these withdrew recognition of the SADR as a State) and some Latin American countries; thanks also to the trade agreements established since 2000 (extended in 2016 with the visit of King Mohamed VI to the Kremlin) with Russia (a country friendly to Algeria that has criticized Donald Trump's decision regarding Morocco's sovereignty over the Sahara) and also to the collaboration established through a Mixed Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation that seeks, in addition to acting in various specific sectors (agriculture, fishing, maritime studies, industry, automotive, energy, mining and chemistry) the installation of Russian companies in Moroccan territory, extensive defense agreements, such as the presence of the Kamaz company (manufacturer of military vehicles) and the purchase of the Amur 1650 submarine to monitor the waters of the Atlantic and those of the Strait of Gibraltar; and, finally, thanks also to the open relations with China in terms of fishing, operating, like Russia, in Saharan waters.
Thus, the objective of the Sahara being internationally recognized as Moroccan territory (“existential question”) has been achieved due to the aforementioned privileged relations, together with its cooperation with Israel since the 1960s and the recent Abraham agreement established with the US under the presidency of Donald Trump; In this agreement, Morocco's strategic position in the Strait of Gibraltar (control and surveillance), ease of passage through its airspace in the event of war and being a key country in the control of of migratory flows to Europe from Africa. The price to pay for their help:the Sahara.
Agreements that have given Morocco a feeling of euphoria and geopolitical and geostrategic power as he had not achieved before, reason for his belligerent and forceful diplomacy with all those countries that demonstrate against his sovereignist thesis (now endorsed by the US) on Western Sahara.
Morocco and the US, a relationship that grows closer
And even more so with the statement of Donald Trump (one month after leaving the White House) that “the [Moroccan] autonomy proposal is, credible and realistic, the basis for a just and lasting solution for lasting peace and prosperity” (a limited autonomy that is contrary to self-determination required by the Saharawi people) which has been a strategic boost to Morocco that the Saharawis hope will change, annulling what was established by Trump, with the already president Joe Biden after his inauguration on January 20, something unlikely given the relations of long-established understanding between the US and Morocco – also taking into account Bill and Hillary Clinton's friendship with King Mohamed VI.
On the other hand, the possible opening of consulates from nineteen African countries and some Arabs in El Ayoun and Dakhla (a city in which a US consulate will be installed with an economic function since there are no US residents in the area) implies the de facto recognition of the aforementioned “Moroccan identity”, of Moroccan sovereignty in the occupied territories. Consulates that, considered "false", "ghosts" and "illegal" by the Saharawis, increased their diplomatic pressure seeking its closure, which they have achieved with that of Burundi, a country that has wanted, according to Saharawi sources, to follow international legality, giving rise to the international dissemination that "Morocco has failed in its policy of deception and its claims to make the world believe its supposed sovereignty over Western Sahara."
In the same line, it must be taken into account, if it is true and not Moroccan propaganda interested in seeking Saharawi demoralization, the statement spread through some of its media that the US central administration, the Pentagon and even the CIA have included the former Spanish Sahara on their official map of Morocco (an inclusion that they continue to claim has also been adopted by NATO).
A sign of continuity with the US position was the visit of a delegation to Dakhla on February 10 led by the Undersecretary of State for the Middle East and North Africa, after his visit to Algiers (where he was asked if Joe Biden would assume Trump's policy regarding Western Sahara), a visit justified by the new ties established and the determination of a building for the future US consulate.
Also, as a closing (looking for the impossibility of running behind), the Legion of Merit, in the category of Commander in Chief, awarded by Donald Trump before his departure from the White House to Moroccan King Mohamed VI for "his vision and personal courage, which has reshaped the landscape of the Middle East and to North Africa and ushered in a new era of security and prosperity» (referring to the opening of relations with Israel); decoration delivered privately to the Moroccan ambassador to the US.
Behind everything is therefore the compensation to Morocco for the opening of full diplomatic relations with Israel , compensation linked to the signing of a "cooperation agreement with the US in the strategic military field, including the acquisition of weapons and other defense equipment (visible armed reinforcement against the Saharawis?), as well as the training of troops and the cooperation between intelligence services”; It must be taken into account that for a long time, since the Cold War, Morocco has been a safe ally for the US, an effective bridge for the transfer of forces to the Middle East as well as "the watchful eye on the strait and, today, especially on the route of Islamist terrorism.”
Elements to which the possibility must be added, according to Moroccan sources (Al-Ayyam newspaper ), in the process of negotiation (denied by the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), within the "road map for military cooperation in defense matters 2020-2030 between Morocco and the US", of the transfer of the military base from Rota (Cádiz) to Tan Tan, in the occupied Sahara , which if true (although it does not seem to be confirmed) would give a new boost to Moroccan policy regarding the Sahara.
Thus, in the face of such events, including the lack of effective armed response to the Polisario Front, it is considered that Morocco has notably increased its international negotiating power during the last decade gaining weight before the international community, while the Saharawis have lost confidence that the UN continues to defend the self-determination referendum and ends up leaning towards the thesis of autonomy. Symptoms:the pending, since 2019, appointment of a special envoy for the Sahara, the failure to fulfill its mediating mission allowing Morocco to increase commercial transactions in the occupied territories –fishing, phosphates…–, the development of infrastructures in them, the union to Morocco as provinces and the support and recognition of the installation in the same of up to 16 consulates of allied countries in the African continent...).
Spain facing the challenge of Moroccan expansionism
In this context of "diplomatic battle" between Rabat and the SADR, the search by the Saharawi for recognition of their existence has been constant (currently they recognize the SADR more than 80 countries which do not include Spain or the EU ) both from cultural, academic, social levels of friendship, diplomats (with the opening of delegations and friendship associations) throughout the world with results of a lower level than those achieved by Morocco. Likewise, currently, it has sought for the international press to break the Moroccan silence regarding its expansionist policy and the war, and for the international community to react to the wave of violent repression that the Saharawis of the occupied territories are suffering from the Moroccan side as form of retaliation for the armed conflict.
Conflict in which Spain, despite continuous indications by the Saharawi and the like that it has a historical and legal responsibility in Western Sahara, including by the UN, which recognizes Spain as "administrating power", has placed itself on the side of the AU, EU, UN and Minurso, appealing to the contenders to "prove the sense of responsibility and containment" in order to seek a political and peaceful solution to the current conflict, as well as to the contentious base through the development of a self-determination referendum; Spanish position that affects the two actors in opposition:
- On the Saharawi side, which does not expect anything from Spain , despite having been its 53rd province, being subject to Moroccan blackmail, further dividing Spanish society and its political representatives, already divided for some time as to the official position regarding the dispute over the Sahara, positions that, summing up , they are situated, in the end, in being against or in favor of Moroccan expansionism and that now translate into support or not for the conflict (in this case seeking a peaceful solution to it).
- On the Moroccan side regarding the actions of influence under pressure exerted by migrations on the Canary Islands and, now, on the cities of Ceuta and Melilla (Denied as Spanish by Morocco).
In the first case (Canary Islands), tolerating them out, supposedly against the agreements established in this regard, as a form of pressure to prevent the Spanish social and political party from favoring of the Saharawi people to actively demonstrate in the face of the Saharawi declaration of war, which has led to a critical situation with the massive influx of immigrants to the Canary Islands (mostly from Dajla, former Villa Cisneros in the Spanish colonial period, in the territories occupied by Morocco, but also from Algeria, Guinea Conakry, Senegal, Mauritania, Nigeria and Mali); migrants who refer as the cause of their diaspora to the critical economic situation they are suffering in their respective countries of origin due to the Covid-19 pandemic and who have chosen such a route in the face of the strict police control of the Strait and the Central Mediterranean. Migration that, given the lack of absorption capacity on the part of the islands and the lack of a project for it, added to the low number of deportations, has caused a social political crisis in the archipelago.
In the second, in relation to the autonomous cities, Morocco, which considers them Moroccan cities, has wanted the Spanish to open a public debate on the matter, it has been exercising repeatedly, since long ago, with the aim of its long-term annexation, a strategy of economic suffocation (it prevents trade – carriers – between these cities and Morocco) by controlling the opportunistic opening and closing of the borders (currently they were closed, taking advantage of the fight against the pandemic on March 12 and they still remain closed). Cities on which the current migratory pressure falls, especially on Ceuta, also accompanied by various fake news to alter the perception of the problem.
2021. Brahim Ghali, Gaza and the migration crisis
Add to the above the delay of the Spain-Morocco High Level Meeting (RAN) that was scheduled for December 17, 2020 under the pretext of the pandemic, thus hiding its real reason:the Moroccan opposition "ultrasensitive" to Spanish considerations, in the mouth of its Minister of Foreign Affairs, Arancha González Laya, regarding the Saharawi conflict, supporting the UN resolutions and those of the then vice president, Pablo Iglesias, in favor of the Saharawis. As well as, in the midst of the conflict, having welcomed the leader of the Polisario Front, Brahim Ghali, under a false name, sick with Covid , in the San Pedro de Logroño hospital, on April 22, for strictly humanitarian reasons (an event silenced by the Saharawis and by Spain); leader who also has an open case in the National High Court for torture and disappearance of dissidents in refugee camps between 1976 and 1987 and for which he has been summoned to testify.
Situation that, according to some analysts, represents a crossroads for the Polisario Front, in addition to the growth of tension between Morocco and Spain, as Rabat has stated to the Spanish ambassador in Morocco:accusing the Spanish executive of disloyalty by not informing his country of the entry into Spain (Zaragoza air base ) of the Saharawi leader in a medicalized plane belonging to the Algerian presidency and with a diplomatic passport from the same country, disturbing the established relations with his welcome, "premeditated" and "behind the back of his partner and neighbor", which is why Morocco has repeatedly requested to Spain a satisfactory and convincing response under the threat that relations between the two countries could be damaged; So far, some bilateral meetings of a technical nature have been suspended and the aforementioned High-Level Meeting has been postponed and, although initially the most sensitive areas of cooperation had not been affected:illegal immigration and jihadism, on 18 May there have been massive illegal entries of irregular Moroccan immigrants in Ceuta (up to 10,000 in a single day with a large number of unaccompanied minors, an unprecedented entry due to their number; about 6,000 of them have been returned immediately) and, likewise, in Melilla, although to a lesser extent; entries that some analysts consider an invasion and a blackmail/form of pressure or retaliatory maneuver against Spain derived from the health entry of the Polisario leader, Brahim Ghali, and, facing Europe, a search for recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara . Massive migratory movement apparently planned, stimulated and supported by the Rabat government.
Tensions, within a chaotic and unprecedented migratory crisis and at the same time diplomatic as a consequence, caused at the bottom of its origin by the favor given to Algeria, the first country supplying gas to Spain, to receive the leader of the Polisario, without taking into account the foreseeable effects on Morocco, and even on the Polisario, which once again urges the Spanish government to accept its political and legal responsibility in the conflict in Western Sahara, forcing Morocco to respect international commitments, without forgetting those on internal policies:Pablo Casado, leader of the PP, declared himself against the reception of Brahim Ghali and, therefore, against the decision of the Government of Pedro Sánchez, and established contacts with parties Moroccan politicians, including Al-Istiqlal, a supporter of the recovery of Ceuta and Melilla (relationship criticized by the Polisario Front).
We are therefore in a situation in which Morocco, feeling strong in the international context, has not wanted to give up its expansionist policy considering it an unforgivable affront to admit the presence of the leader of the Polisario Front in Spain in the midst of an armed conflict.
And so, Morocco, showing its discomfort, tries to coerce the Spanish Government to admit the thesis of its sovereignty over Western Sahara and, in this way, submits now to Ceuta under serious migratory pressure (without a response from the US, which considers it a bilateral problem to be resolved between Spain and Morocco), while seeking to exert pressure on the false "Moroccan identity" of said city. This without also losing sight of the fact that Rabat may be trying to divert to Moroccan nationalism the popular criticism that it could receive for its relationship with Israel, a relationship that its people do not understand, at a time when, with the violence in Gaza, the Arab countries are demonstrating in support of the Palestinian people (to meet such criticism, Morocco has sent humanitarian aid to the Palestinian people).
Moroccan pressure on Spain, now specified in Ceuta, which has led to the forceful and immediate response of the Spanish Government regarding the Spanish sovereignty of said city and the reminder that its border is with Spain and also with the EU; response that has not left Morocco indifferent, which has also received complaints from some citizens about the manipulation exerted on those young people who have been pushed to the risk of migration, which has forced, it seems, the closure of its border and prevented access to it with their security forces.
"Neighborhood" tension, serious and complex, which, being Morocco and Spain condemned to understand each other On the basis of confirmed common interests, the diplomatic route will have to be resolved from mutual respect, better sooner than later, to safeguard them and be able to create a future path of understanding.