On the afternoon of June 27, 1944, with the German front in Belarus having collapsed from the great Soviet offensive, the first trains with units of the 12th Panzer Division began to arrive in the rear zone of the former 9th Army. The 12th Panzer would attempt to contain the Soviet advance north of Bobruisk.
The 12th Panzer was formed in 1940 from personnel of the 2nd Motorized Division. fought continuously on the Eastern Front since 1941. The Division had a relatively high level of manning, but was poorly equipped. It had 11,600 men and 681 Soviets, some of them with German roots – Volga Germans – Hivis (Soviet auxiliary ex-POWs).
Command was taken over by the division's operations officer, Lt. Col. Gerd Niepold. . The 12th Panzer had just 35 PZ IV tanks with a 75mm gun. 48 caliber and 9 Pz III with 50mm gun. 60 calibers. The 12th had all four of its intended grenadier battalions, one of which had half-tracked vehicles. The division's organic 2nd Artillery Regiment had 22 guns. Of its anti-tank battalion the division had only one company. Also absent was its anti-aircraft squadron and its reconnaissance squadron.
Unpleasant surprises
The first elements of the division, one tank company and two motorized infantry companies arrived in the area and immediately rushed to occupy dominant ground. The detachment was headed by Lt. Col. Niepold, who immediately rushed to the headquarters of the 9th Army to ask for instructions. There he met with an old acquaintance, his teacher from the staff school, Lt. General Staedtke.
But the welcome he gave him was completely discouraging. "Nice to see you," she told him. “But the 9th Army is no more,” he concluded, leaving Nielpont dumbfounded. The lieutenant colonel was informed of the tragedy of the situation. Only remnants of units, in poor condition, were still fighting , forming mobile pockets that marched slowly westward. The largest part of the 9th Army was surrounded in the area around Bobruisk.
Soviet Marshal Rokosovsky had left his infantry to finish off the encircled Germans and had thrown his fast-moving elements into deep strategic exploitation. Two Soviet fast-moving corps were moving at maximum speed, almost undisturbed, towards the West, with the objective of capturing Baranovici and cutting off all German forces in the area.
Niepold who was sent to the area was disappointed. “All sense of discipline and order has been lost. There are blown up vehicles and abandoned cannons everywhere. Essentially there were only phalanxes of panicked men trying to cross the bridge there as quickly as possible and reach Bobruisk. When the enemy began to bombard the area with their artillery and air force, the chaos reached its peak" , recounted later.
Fire operation of the 12th Panzer
Meanwhile Hitler still believed that the Soviet attack on Belorussia was a distraction and that the main enemy attack would take place in Northern Ukraine. The new commander of the Army Group that he installed took care to relieve him of his utopias. Marshal Modell was an officer loyal to the Nazi regime, but he was an officer first and not a party lackey.
Both he and the new commander of the 9th Armyfound that they had only one battle-worthy division at their disposal, the 12th Panzer, and not the whole of it. And the situation in Bobruisk had become desperate. Finally, the German forces there were almost completely annihilated.
Meanwhile on the battlefield the trains carrying the elements of the 12th Panzer continued to arrive. The division's transfer continued on 29 and 30 June. Elements of the 12th Panzer were thrown into battle immediately after disembarking from the trains and were trying to form a rudimentary defensive line on the Zfizlof River. At 3:00 p.m. on June 30, the commander of the 9th Army contacted Niepold and asked him if the division he actually commanded was in a position to attack the Soviets to help the divisions that were trying to escape.
Niepold replied that he was unable to hold the Soviets on the river line and commit forces to attack as well. The new commander of the 9th, General Foreman initially did not insist. But later he contacted Niepold again and this time ordered him, apparently under pressure from above, to attack within the next 24 hours.
But he left it to Niepold's discretion how and with what forces he would carry out his order. Niepold, having no other choice, decided to attack with a company of tanks and his motorized grenadier battalion, forming a tactical group, under the motorized battalion commander, Major Blancbois.
Blansbois organization and despair
This complex, after being supplied with fuel and ammunition. Just after nightfall the Blancbois group traveled 35 km through narrow forest roads. But before the head of the German phalanx reached the only river bridge in the area, it was in for a very unpleasant surprise. The Soviets were already there. They had already formed a bridgehead and had already organized it defensively, while on the opposite bank they had lined up at least 15 anti-tank guns. As the first German tank moved towards the bridge it received a direct hit from an anti-tank on the crawler and stopped on the bridge.
The Germans reacted in a flash but the Soviets also reinforced their divisions. All morning the battle continued with undiminished intensity, but finally the Germans were intercepted. A group of German fugitives nevertheless managed to cross the river further north and join the Blancbois group. The fugitives tried to commandeer the vehicles of the motorized battalion to get away as fast as they could. Only with the threat of weapons did the grenadiers manage to prevent them. The fugitives were desperate. They had lost all sense of humanity. They were hungry and most of them had no clothes and their uniforms were tattered.
Indicative of the panic and complete breakdown of discipline was the fact that many men executed officers they did not know, seeing them as 'sold out to the Russians'. The group of Blanchboys remained in their positions until late in the afternoon, rescuing as many fugitives as they could. But then he was ordered to retreat. Blancbois, however, refused to obey, until the last bands of fugitives had crossed the river. He finally left around 18.00, carrying the fugitives who were in the worst condition on the vehicles. Thanks to the persistence of Blancbois, about 15,000 men were saved.
Niepold watched the phalanxes of the retreating men of the 9th Army. “It was a horrible sight. Few still had weapons. Most walked supported by sticks, full of bandages or cloths to hide their wounds. I was shocked' , it was narrated. Over the next few days the 12th Panzer managed to move and break the cordon the Soviets had created around it. The division was saved, but with enormous losses in men and material.