Realizing that this incident could be very morale-boosting if handled skillfully, Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Danahy, Chief of Intelligence at Divisional Headquarters, wrote in his daily report that "The general's response, under a sarcastic appearance of humorous patience, had been energetically negative.”
On December 22, the day that usually saw
the end of the German effort everywhere else in the Ardennes, the weather returned to good weather. Although this was important for the unfolding of the battle in the other sectors, by allowing the Allied fighter-bombers to play a decisive role in stopping the German armored points, it was only a relative benefit for the 101st Div. . Of course, vital supplies would be able to be dropped, but the German planes would also be able to bomb the city, and the enemy troops would have excellent weather for the fight, despite the snow and the cold. About 241 aircraft dropped supplies on the 23rd, 160 the following day, but none on Christmas Day, the weather being unsuitable; on the other hand, on the 26th, 289 planes again brought supplies. Most of the tonnage dropped consisted of artillery ammunition, without which the resistance of the garrison would have become more than problematic. Fighter-bombers also successfully intervened against the besiegers, using ordinary or cluster bombs, napalm and their on-board weapons.
The fighting took a desperate turn on
23 December, following serious incursions by the Panzer Lehr on the southern flank before being stopped by the 327th Regt. Lt. Col. Harry Kinnard, head of the operations section at Headquarters Div. informed his VIII Corps counterpart in the following terms:“As far as our situation is concerned, things are starting to smell bad here. They (the 1st Armored Div.) have to come over here. The enemy has attacked all over the south, and tanks have broken through and are prowling around us. I ask that you inform 4th Div. armored with our situation and tell them to go all out. This was a remarkable understatement of 101st Div.'s problems, but also a correct appreciation that the garrison could only be saved by 4th Div. armor coming from the south.